All posts by Laurence Coupe

Myth, Ideology and Identity

First published as ‘Foreword’, Amina Alyal & Paul Hardwick (eds), Classical and Contemporary Mythic Identities (Lampeter: Mellen Press, 2010), pp xi-xiii. Minor changes have been made to the wording.

 

Myth, Ideology and Identity: A Note

Laurence Coupe

About twenty years ago I launched an undergraduate course, ‘Myths Ancient and Modern’, only to be told by a colleague that he objected to the name. At first I thought that what bothered him was the rather weak pun on the title of the Church of England hymn book. But no, it was rather that I had chosen to use the word ‘myth’ instead of ‘ideology’. I suppose that he envisaged students sitting around and swapping their favourite fables, instead of engaging with the rigours of class struggle. Rather than enter into an etymological debate, I merely suggested that ‘Ideologies Ancient and Modern’ did not have quite the same rhetorical flourish as my chosen wording. We politely agreed to differ.

The point of this anecdote is that ‘myth’ has been, and remains, a contentious term. As Amina Alyal and Paul Hardwick’s volume of essays shows us, it is best deployed when our awareness of its more negative connotations does not blind us to its own special demands, as an elemental expression of the narrative imagination. Thus, the notion of ideology may figure here, either explicitly or implicitly, but it is never applied in a crude, reductive manner. The myths examined are given, as it were, room to breathe. Indeed, each contributor seems to have spent a good deal of time, not only pondering the nature of myth but also asking themselves just where they stand in relation to the myths that interest them. In keeping with the phrase ‘contemporary myth’ (rather more demanding than my own ‘modern’), we could not ask for a more vital or wide-ranging demonstration of the continuing relevance of mythic themes, patterns and symbols.

From the Book of Genesis to present-day conspiracy theories, from Pandora’s box to Pan’s Labyrinth, from the adventures of the Irish warrior Cuchulain to the wanderings of Dylan’s hobo, from satyrs to cyborgs, we discover what is possible if one is prepared to read myth with creative ambivalence: not only as a misleading explanation of the world where necessary, but also as a mind-expanding exploration where possible. Or, to put this another way: we see that recognising the ideology that shadows mythology should not prevent one from taking the latter seriously in its own right. Whether myths assume a local colour, as with the ‘wild spirit’ Tregeagle of Cornish folklore, whether they are filtered through the celebrity which attends the production of popular fiction, as with Ian Fleming’s novels, or whether they are reworked in keeping with changing ideals of femininity, as in Hollywood films and cult TV series, there can be no doubt that they are indispensable for understanding where we are – and, more importantly, who we are.

In this connection, Alyal and Hardwick refer to ‘the construction of identity’, a phrase that we might pause to situate briefly. We all know that there has been a longstanding trend in critical theory to see both non-human and human nature as linguistic constructs, to an extent – the various theorists differing as to just how extensive they want to be. With regard to non-human nature, it is surely time to draw the line. I know that I am not the only one to protest that to say that our understanding of reality is always partial and perspectival is not necessarily to imply that there is ‘no such thing as nature’ (see Coupe 2009: 95-101). However, if it is humanity which is the focus, and if the crucial construction at issue here is that of identity, then it is surely undeniable that our very selves, apparently so substantial, are constantly being shaped and reshaped by the power of myth. By the same token, our collective identity – that is, culture itself – may pretend to be based on logos, or rational truth, but is really formed through mythos, or narrative imagination.

Allowing for the constructed aspect of the human character, we yet need to recognise, in this age of imminent ecocatastrophe, that the most important identity which myth makes possible is that between humanity and nature. James Lovelock realised this when he decided to use the name of the Greek mother goddess, Gaia, for his vision of the planet as a living organism. He knew that people are much less likely to care for an abstract ‘earth system’ than for a sacred personage who appeals to our imagination and love of story-telling  (Lovelock 1989: 209). But how may this insight into the human response to nature be reconciled with the notion of human nature as constructed? I would suggest that waking up to the provisional and contingent nature of our collective identity is precisely what is required if we are to rid ourselves of the assumption that we have, as the ‘superior’ species, an absolute right to exploit, pollute and destroy the natural world.

Kenneth Burke once remarked that human beings ‘build their cultures by huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an abyss’  (Burke 1984: 72).  Thus our most recurrent narratives may function to bolster a fragile sense of collective identity. But he also believed that one of the main values of imagination was that of ‘preventing a society from becoming too assertively, too hopelessly itself’ (Burke 1968: 105). The contributors to this volume exhibit a flair for demonstrating how our most recurrent narratives, while frequently being used to vindicate a given sense of collective identity, cannot help but provide a glimpse of another way of inhabiting the earth.

With my initial anecdote in mind, I would suggest that it is entirely appropriate that the key word of Alyal and Hardwick’s title is ‘mythic’ and not ‘ideological’. I am sure that their collection of essays will inspire other scholars to explore the rich field of mythology with the same spirit of informed enquiry.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Burke, Kenneth, Counter-Statement, 2nd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968)

—– Permanence and Change, 3rd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)

Coupe, Laurence, Myth, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2009)

Lovelock, James, The Ages of Gaia: The Biography of Our Living Earth (Oxford: OUP, 1989)

Sayings of Kenneth Burke

SELECTED SAYINGS OF KENNETH BURKE

 

For more on KB, see my articles ‘Kenneth Burke — Pioneer of Ecocriticism’ (here on the Kenneth Burke page) and ‘Green Theory’ (on the ‘Green Studies’ page).
See also my article on KB’s grandson Harry Chapin: https://www.popmatters.com/harry-chapin-music-symbolic-action

# ‘Flowerishes’

Here are some of the many aphorisms — what Burke calls ‘Flowerishes’ —  which are hidden within the word diagrams in his Collected Poems (a volume which unfortunately has been out of print for many years). I have here chosen the ones that I find myself quoting most often. Please note that Burke’s  ‘Flowerishes’ are not offered as solemn philosophical statements: rather they show him thinking aloud, trying out ideas, in the spirit of what he calls ‘the comic frame of acceptance’. (For more on this perspective, see longer quotations below.)
Even humility can go to one’s head.
At the very start, one’s terms jump to conclusions.
When he didn’t fight other people, he fought himself — and boy, could he fight dirty!
We always avoid being stupid like other people by being stupid in ways of our own.
Must it always be wishful thinking? Can’t it sometimes be thoughtful wishing?
If you can learn to benefit from adverse criticism, your enemies will work for you without pay.
When people started agreeing with him he lost all his convictions.
This job is so top secret I don’t know what I’m doing.
Though he despised mankind, he dearly loved an audience.
He resolved always to wait two weeks before committing suicide.
He felt it was alright to do like the others, if only he did it with a bad conscience.
To cover their delay they tell you to hurry.
Poets with little to say learn to write as though guarding a secret.
Afraid of losing his faith in scepticism….
Of all sad words of tongue and pen / The saddest are these: ‘I knew him when…’

Also:

From Counter-Statement, 1931

1.An art may be of value purely through preventing a society from becoming too assertively, too hopelessly itself.
2. When in Rome, do as the Greeks.

 

#Longer quotations from the main body of Burke’s work

Please note:
I have provided a short descriptive heading (in square brackets and in uppercase) for each of these longer quotations.
In his earlier work, Burke used the generic term ‘man’ in place of ‘human being’, as was the standard practice when he was writing. In his later work, he sought to rectify this habit.
Many of these statements are discussed elsewhere on the ‘Kenneth Burke’ page, and in my book Kenneth Burke: From Myth to Ecology, Parlor Press, 2013. See also ‘Green Theory’, on the ‘Green Studies’ page, for a particular focus on Burke’s ‘Definition of Man’, included below.

From Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose,  1935

1. [ON A SYMBOLIC APPROACH TO HUMAN FULFILMENT]
Might the great plethora of symbolizations lead, through the science of symbolism itself, back to a concern with ‘the Way’, the conviction that there is one fundamental source of human satisfaction, forever being glimpsed and lost again, and forever being restated in the changing terms of reference that correspond with the changes of historic texture?  All that earlier thinkers said of the universe might at least be taken as applying to the nature of man.  One may doubt that such places as heaven, hell, and purgatory await us after death – but one may well suspect that the psychological patterns which they symbolize lie at the roots of our conduct here and now.
2.[IN DEFENCE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF BEING, AS OPPOSED TO A PHILOSOPHY OF BECOMING… ]
In subscribing to a philosophy of  being, as here conceived, one may hold that certain historically conditioned institutions interfere with the establishment of decent social or communicative relationships, and thereby affront the permanent biologic [sic] norms.
3. [ON THE FRAGILITY OF HUMAN CULTURE]
We in cities rightly grow shrewd at appraising man-made institutions – but beyond these tiny concentration points of rhetoric and traffic, there lies the eternally unresolvable Enigma, the preposterous fact that both existence and nothingness are quite unthinkable.  Our speculations may run the whole qualitative gamut, from play, through reverence, even to an occasional shiver of cold metaphysical dread – for always the Eternal Enigma is there, right on the edge of our metropolitan bickerings, stretching outward to interstellar infinity and inward to the depth of the mind.  And in this staggering disproportion between man and no-man, there is no place for purely human boasts of grandeur, or for forgetting that men build their cultures by huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an abyss.

 

From Attitudes Towards History, 1937

1. [BURKE’S FIRST USE OF THE TERM ‘ECOLOGY’]
Among the sciences, there is one little fellow named ‘Ecology’, and in time we shall pay him more attention. He teaches us that the total economy of the planet cannot be guided by an efficient rationale of exploitation alone, but that the exploiting part must eventually suffer if it too greatly disturbs the balance of the whole…  So far, the laws of ecology have begun avenging themselves against restricted human concepts of profit by countering deforestation and deep plowing with floods, droughts, dust storms, and aggravated soil erosion. And in a capitalist economy, these trends will be arrested only insofar as collectivist ingredients of control are introduced.
2.[AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS MARXISM]
The Marxian perspective presents a point of view outside the accepted circle of contingencies.  Or, more accurately stated: the Marxian perspective is partially outside this circle.  It is outside as regards the basic tenets of capitalistic enterprise.  It is inside as regards the belief in the ultimate values of industrialism.
3.[ALL ‘ATTITUDES’ IMPLY A MEDITATIVE STANCE BEYOND THE HISTORIC CONDITIONS, EVEN IF THEY DON’T ATTAIN THEM…]
… And saturating the lot is the attitude of attitudes which we call ‘the comic frame’, the methodic view of human antics as a comedy, albeit as a comedy ever on the verge of the most disastrous tragedy.
          If ‘comedy’ is our attitude of attitudes, then the process of processes which this comedy meditates upon is the ‘bureaucratization of the imaginative’. This formula is designed to name the vexing things that happen when men try to translate some pure aim or vision into terms of its corresponding material embodiment, thus necessarily involving elements alien to the original , ‘spiritual’ (‘imaginative’) motive.
4.[ON THE ‘COMIC FRAME OF ACCEPTANCE’]
The comic frame .. does not waste the world’s rich store of error, as those parochial-minded persons waste it who dismiss all thought before a certain date as ‘ignorance’ and ‘superstition’.  Instead, it cherishes the lore of so-called ‘error’ as a genuine aspect of the truth, with emphases valuable for the correcting of present emphases. …
5.[ON WHY WE USE COMEDY AS OUR MODEL…]
Like tragedy, comedy warns against the dangers of pride, but its emphasis shifts from crime to stupidity.  … The progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as vicious but as mistaken.  When you add that people are necessarily mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great tragedy.
6. [FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE ‘COMIC FRAME’]
In sum, the comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting.  Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness.  One would ‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles. …
The comic frame of acceptance but carries to completion the translative act. It considers human life as a project in ‘composition’, where the poet works with the materials of  social relationships.   Composition, translation, also ‘revision’, hence offering maximum opportunity for the resources of criticism.

 

From ‘Definition of Man’, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method, 1966

1. [THE DEFINITION ITSELF]
Man is
the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal
inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)
separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making
goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)
and rotten with perfection.
2. [FOOTNOTE ON THE NEED FOR A ‘CULT OF COMEDY’]
… Aristotle mentions the definition of man as the ‘laughing animal’, but he does not consider it adequate. Though I would hasten to agree, I obviously have a big investment in it, owing to my conviction that mankind’s only hope is a cult of comedy. The cult of tragedy is too eager to help out with the holocaust. And in the last analysis, it is too pretentious to allow for the proper recognition of our animality.

 

From ‘Poetics and Communication’ (essay published in 1970)

[REFLECTING ON ECOLOGY, BURKE EXPANDS ON HIS METHOD OF INTERPRETATION, ‘DRAMATISM’, WHICH SEES LANGUAGE AS A FORM OF SYMBOLIC ACTION (AS ABOVE). HE ALSO ALLUDES TO HIS OWN NOTION OF RHETORIC AS A MEANS OF ENSURING ‘IDENTIFICATION’.]
Dramatistic admonitions suggest: It would be much better for us, in the long run, if we ‘identified ourselves’ rather with the natural things that we are progressively destroying – our trees, our rivers, our land, even our air, all of which we are a lowly ecological part of.  For here, in the long run, a pious ‘loyalty to the sources of our being’ (Santayana) would pay off best, even in the grossly materialistic sense.  For it would better help preserve the kinds of natural balance on which, in the last analysis, mankind’s prosperity, and even our mere existence, depend. But too often, in such matters, our attitudes are wholly segregational, as we rip up things that we are not – and thus can congratulate ourselves upon having evolved a way of life able to exhaust in decades a treasure of natural wealth that had been here for thousands of years.

 

 

 

From Dramatism and Development, 1972

[BURKE DRAWS ON ARISTOTLE’S PRINCIPLE OF ‘ENTELECHY’, IE, THE IMPULSE OF ALL MATERIAL PHENOMENA TO REALISE THEIR FULL POTENTIAL AND ATTAIN THEIR FULL FORM. BURKE SEES HUMAN ‘ENTELECHY’ AS HAVING NOW BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH ‘TECHNOLOGY’. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, HE EXPRESSES THE NEED FOR A NEW KIND OF ‘HUMANISM’…] 
Humanism, as so conceived, would look especially askance at the typical promoter’s ideal of a constant rapid increase in the consumption of ‘energy’(though perhaps it is a trend that the whole ‘logic’ of investment comes close to making imperative).  And an anti-Technological Humanism would be ‘animalistic’ in the sense that, far from boasting of some privileged human status, it would never disregard our humble, and maybe even humiliating, place in the totality of the natural order.

        

 

Freud’s THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS and Modern Hermeneutics

Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams
and Modern Hermeneutics

Laurence Coupe

Originally published in Sigmund Freud: Critical Approaches, ed. Laurie Spurling (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), Vol III, pp. 340-353.

 

Introduction

The word ‘hermeneutics’ may be defined as ‘theory of interpretation’; it is usually complemented by the word ‘exegesis’, which denotes the application of that theory. Hermeneutics is at least as old as scriptural scholar¬ship: the post-exilic rabbis and the early church fathers sought to systematize their reading of the Torah and the Judaeo-Christian Bible respectively. But it was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that ‘hermeneutic’ signified a problematic. At that stage the other etymological elements in the term came to the fore: for the ancient Greek word from which it derived (the texts of Homer themselves had merited a systematic reading) had not one but three orientations of meaning. Apart from ‘interpretation’, hermenuein carried the suggestions of ‘expression’ and ‘translation’; and it was the questions raised by these — on the one hand authorial intentionality and on the other the later reader’s cultural distance from that moment — which came to embarrass the interpretative procedure.

The hermeneutical tension has been summarized by E.D. Hirsch as that between ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’. He formulates his distinction as follows:

Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs repre¬sent. Significance, on the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything else imaginable.(1)

For Hirsch a proper hermeneutics is that which does not confuse the one with the other. True interpretation always returns to the possible intention of the author, within which resides the meaning; mere evaluation tends to subsume the intended sign sequence under the critic’s own preoccupations, responses and conjectures.
In what follows I shall have occasion to draw on Hirsch’s distinction as a useful framework for outlining the development of modern hermeneutics. However, his own interest — in prioritizing ‘meaning’ over ‘significance’ — will itself be thrown into question as we come to consider the contribution of Freud to that history.

Hermeneutics before Freud

Before coming to Freud, we need a short overview of the theory of interpretation, as understood before his intervention.(2)

Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), as a professional apologist for Christianity, was prompted to make, in response to the Enlightenment’s spirit of critique, a crucial distinction. He acknowledged that science was indeed a legitimate attempt to describe the external world; but he argued that it was a mistake for science to encroach upon the area of human feeling, that inner realm from which religious faith proceeded. In other words, objectivity could only take one so far; it could not account for the subjective state of, first, self-consciousness and second, following from that, dependence on God.

However, Schleiermacher’s was no simple rearguard action. He was quite prepared to open up the Bible to analysis of a scientific disposition: indeed, he was himself a major exponent of historical and critical scholarship within theology. Only, he wished to guide analysis by synthetic intuition, or what he called ‘divination’. ‘Grammatical’ interpretation — philology, textual study, comparative method — was a necessary rehearsal for faith; but faith itself was ultimately a matter of ‘psychological’ interpretation.

It is necessary to understand that Schleiermacher’s distinction is essentially continuous with that made by the early church fathers. They had assumed that the ‘literal’ meaning of the Judaeo-Christian Bible was trans¬parent in the same way as the ‘law’ had appeared to the scribes of Jesus’ day: the word of God had found perfect expression in the words of men. Where difficulties arose, and a particular text seemed inaccessible, it was to be recuperated by way of a ‘figurative’ reading. For example, the curious episode in the Book of Genesis, in which Jacob wrestles until daybreak with an unidentified opponent, was interpreted allegorically by Origen and St Jerome as an image of the need for the Christian to persevere in prayer.(3)

Within medieval Catholicism this distinction held good, now elaborated (in the light of the fathers’ hints) into a systematic exegesis authorized by ecclesiastical doctrine. Thus, though the scriptures were proclaimed to be thoroughly accessible, all interpretation was subject to the supervision of an increasingly authoritarian church. It was precisely such dogmatism that the reformers Luther and Calvin sought to resist, by returning abruptly to the ‘literal’ meaning of the sacred texts: far from needing definition by the episcopal hierarchy, the Bible interpreted itself freely to all those who had the faith.

However, once that step had been taken, and the divine word made entirely manifest once more, the scriptures became extremely vulnerable. As the historical and critical methods of the later seventeenth century were consolidated by the rational scepticism of the Enlightenment, theologians such as Schleiermacher had to defend Christianity itself from the apparently reductive drive of objective scholarship. In doing so, he could not fall back upon the kind of figurative recuperation sanctioned by the church fathers; but he effectively produced an enlightened variant upon it.

Thus we may see his ‘grammatical’ as a logical extension of the earlier ‘literal’ interpretation: indeed, both usages were known to Origen; Schleiermacher simply extended the definition of ‘grammar’. More importantly, ‘psychological’, with its Kantian acknowledgement of the role of the perceiver in constructing the world, revised ‘figurative’ interpretation. Nor should we ignore how this latter move simultaneously complied with Romantic interest in the mysteries of genius and in organic form. Thus the end of interpretation was the ‘divination’ of the author’s world, thought to inform the text at every point. Such an emphasis was certainly new in theology: previously the evangelists had been considered important chiefly in so far as their texts bore witness to the truth of the Messiah. It was not that biographical conjecture was being commended: rather, the specific gospel yielded hint after hint as to the authorial ‘psychology’, or spirit. The interpreter’s task was to perform a full ‘grammatical’ analysis and, as he proceeded, to infer from the parts examined — the words, the sentences, the chapters — the totality of the evangelist’s inspiration. Schleiermacher recognized the dialectical nature of this process, but went little further than to name it: ‘the hermeneutic circle’.(4)

It was left to Wilhelm Dilthey (1883-1911) to explore this whole problematic in philosophical — more specifically, epistemological — terms. For him hermeneutics was a ‘philosophy of life’ and the interpretation of texts a model of human understanding as such. Thus in the Diltheyan perspective Schleiermacher’s ‘circle’ applied not only to the scriptures but to all cultural expressions of the past: indeed these might not be texts at all (though literature, including the Bible was expression par excellence), but might take the form of rituals, institutions, laws.

To clarify Dilthey’s advance, we need to remind ourselves of the spirit of critique which we associate with the Enlightenment and which culminated in the figure of Kant. Schleiermacher felt it necessary to placate that spirit and acknowledge that figure by addressing the claims of science and by using a Kantian strategy to defend piety (religious feeling, like perception, being creative and autonomous). But Dilthey no longer felt that critical metaphysics offered any serious challenge to the interests he had inherited from Schleiermacher. On the contrary, he set out to restore Kant’s transcendental self to the ‘lived experience’ of history. For his enemy was not the metaphysical but the merely physical, as privileged by positivism; and he felt free to draw on Kant where necessary in his own critique, quite other than Kantian, of the new orthodoxy.

Hence in response to claims that the ‘natural sciences’ were sufficient basis for describing the world, he posited the need for ‘human sciences’ which might do justice to the subtleties of mental experience. Inert ‘explanation’ was not enough: active ‘understanding’ was called for. His ‘hermeneutic circle’ was a matter of tracing connections, subtly and progressively. This, he felt, was possible because the ‘psychological’ was not merely (as with his mentor) an individual category, but collective, cultural and historical.

Dilthey deemed humanity to be characterized by its capacity to express, and so to understand, experience. Human beings inevitably sought connections, within the world and with other human beings, in the present and with the past. In this last instance, involvement in the hermeneutic circle arose as the process of empathy, or understanding, began. For in pondering any cultural object of the past – notably, a literary text — one was seeking to bridge a huge gap of cultural difference. The author may have had an individual experience which he wished to express in the objective form of the text; but informing the author’s experience was a whole culture, which also sanctioned the textual form. Thus the interpreter was seeking to infer, not only an individual author’s ‘world’, but a whole ‘life unity’. The hermeneutic circle was not a textual dialectic, or even a text¬-author dialectic, but an emergent recognition of the ‘commonality’ of life unities within and beyond the cultural and temporal discrepancies. For what linked all cultural objects was the very fact of expressivity: that human need which, having found form, demanded the human response of interpretation.

We may judge Dilthey’s importance in extending Schleiermacher’s insights by juxtaposing their respective summations of the hermeneutic enterprise. For the earlier thinker, ‘Strict interpretation begins with misunderstanding and searches out a precise meaning.’ It was left to Dilthey to demonstrate systematically the impossibility of final understanding, and to make of cultural relativism a complete epistemology:

Our understanding of life is only a constant approximation; that life reveals quite different sides to us according to the point of view from which we consider its course in time is due to the nature of both understanding and life.(5)

Thus, where Schleiermacher worked on the premise that the individual author’s intention might ultimately be inferred and ‘meaning’ (in Hirsch’s usage) known, hermeneutics was now an account of historical humanity as constantly engaged in the creative tension between ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’.

It may still be possible, however, to deny Dilthey the role of guiding spirit within twentieth-century interpretation. Two reservations are worth mentioning here.

One concerns his assumption of identity. Though Dilthey emphasized the temporal point of view, he did not go so far as to advocate an affective critical position: relativism did not permit a hermeneutics of pure response. The interpreter was, he argued, constrained by the original historical moment of the author’s experience as objectified in cultural expression. ‘Significance’ was not possible without ‘meaning’, and ‘meaning’ was inseparable from expressivity; the author’s cultural identity was at one with his textual identity.

The second reservation, which follows from the first, is that Dilthey’s extension of Schleiermacher’s ‘psychological’ interest, though it evaded the problematic of direct encounter (one to one, between writer and reader), was yet informed by an assumption of integrity. In the act of textual expression, the person of the author was conceived of as a psychic unity. Just as author coincided with his text, so he coincided, as it were, with himself. No contradictions were involved.

In both these related areas — identity and integrity — Freud’s unwitting contribution to modem hermeneutics was to prove decisive.

 

Freud’s hermeneutics

In traditional hermeneutics, as we have seen, the fundamental distinction was between the ‘literal’ and the ‘figurative’. Schleiermacher, extending the former concern by use of historical and critical scholarship, revised the latter as ‘divination’. Though this intuitive interest was parallel to the Romantic emphasis on imaginative individuality, he himself did not go so far as to explore the mysterious activities of genius. Nor indeed did his successor Dilthey, whose distinction between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’, though derived from that of Schleiermacher between the ‘grammatical’ and the ‘psychological’ dimensions, was meant to justify an emphasis on cultural experience and expression rather than on Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s individual ‘shaping spirit of imagination’. His ‘human sciences’ privileged communication above psychic exploration; for him artefacts were signs rather than symbols, indicative rather than polysemous.

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) published Die Traumdeutung, subsequently translated as The Interpretation of Dreams, in 1899 (though it was actually dated 1900). By then he had already begun to demonstrate the inadequacy of a communication model of epistemology. With his colleague Breuer he had outlined four years earlier a sketch of the human ‘unconscious’, difficult of access due to the necessary mechanism of ‘repression’. The symptoms of hysterical patients, it seemed, resulted from the over-zealous repression of a ‘traumatic’ memory. Such a symptom would involve the patient in a long, tortuous process of therapy before the moment of ‘abreaction’, when the repressed memory would be released and a cure would be possible. This was because it was in the nature of hysterical symptoms to be ‘over-determined’, to arise from more than one event (the memory being in fact many memories).(6)

Granted that the hysteric was an extreme representative of dissociation, the very psychic model Freud had employed — memory, repression, unconscious — was enough to throw into question the expressive, integrated subject which Dilthey’s hermeneutics had assumed. Freud was discovering a humanity at odds with itself, a victim of the contradictory structure of its own psyche.

In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud turned from symptoms to symbols, from hysterical deviation to the universal activity of sleep narrative, thus compounding the earlier challenge to assumptions of identity and integrity. Early on in the work, he explicitly rejects any kind of analysis which takes symbols to be signs, which expects a unitary meaning to be deciphered by reference to a handbook of unvarying symbolic properties. Freud seeks, as a psychoanalyst, to go beyond mere transcoding to a delicate articulation of the psychic production of images discernible in the patient’s ‘free association’ in therapy. Thus Dilthey’s cultural relativism becomes oneiric pluralism, that is, the acknowledgement of varying dream motives: ‘I … am prepared to find that the same piece of content may conceal a different meaning when it occurs in various people or in various contexts’.(7) Though in any culture there will be a body of fixed symbols — in his own Freud discovers parents frequently represented by kings and queens, the penis by a tower or umbrella, the womb by a box or ship — what is important is the use to which these are put, the way they are structured in dream form by the particular patient. Interpretation, he claims, is not an empty repetition of the universal insight that the dream represents a ‘wish-fulfilment’. Rather, it has to negotiate the implications of the complete formula — ‘a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish’ — in case after case which resists the analytical aspiration to typicality.(8) Moreover, even when the dream has been revealed as embodying a repressed wish, one is still left with the distance between the fulfilling dream and the unfulfilled dreamer.

In the context of hermeneutics The Interpretation of Dreams might be regarded as the systematic acknowledgement of a split within interpretation. On the one hand, there persists the socially-oriented aim of mediating understanding, of clarifying that which has been obscure, and giving it discursive form. Indeed, Freud himself has to assume a unity of some kind in order to articulate the mystery: thus he refers to the process of ‘secondary revision’ by which most dreams attain their narrative shape, making them in effect dreams which have been ‘already interpreted once, before being submitted to waking interpretation’. On the other hand, the ‘dream-thoughts’ which he is seeking to elucidate do themselves bear witness to an anti-social, non-discursive realm of desire, conflict and angry frustration. The epigraph for the book from Virgil is thus well-chosen: ‘If I cannot move heaven, I will stir up the underworld.’ The repressed dream-wish ‘stirs up’ the ‘underworld’ of the unconscious and casts a shadow over the rational order of ‘heaven’.(9)

Here it may be objected that Freud was hardly the first western thinker to recognize the barbaric impulses within the apparently civilized mind. Schopenhauer had already depicted the world as ruled by a blind, insurgent ‘will’, and had advocated (with a new desperation) the traditional ideal of salvation through contemplation and art.(10) Nietzsche, resisting the hope of transcendence, had insisted that the ‘Dionysian’ remains a constant in our thinking even, or especially, when we presume to attain ‘Apollonian’ clarity and order.(11) However, Freud in the Interpretation goes further than either of these in setting out to demonstrate the workings of psychic contradiction or non-coincidence within a series of specific textual studies, and to use a specialised vocabulary to describe the textual organization.

The texts (which include not only patients’ dreams but also Freud’s own, together with works of literature), I shall consider briefly in the next section. Here it will be appropriate to explain some of the vocabulary. Most important to grasp is the distinction between the ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ contents of the dream. The wish-fulfilment, emerging or ascending into dream consciousness when the activity of sleep has weakened the forces of repression, is in the process given the surface interest of imagery, or plastic representation. The two main imaginative devices are ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’.

In the first instance, elements normally kept apart in waking life are fused in the dream: Freud cites the example of the ‘botanical monograph’ which in one of his own dreams represented many ideas, experiences and obsessions in one ‘manifest’ image. Like the symptom of the hysteric, condensation is made possible by the psychic arrangement of ‘over-determination’: the dream thereby fulfils several wishes, not just one. ‘If a dream is written out it may perhaps fill half a page. The analysis setting out the dream-thoughts underlying it may occupy six, eight or a dozen times as much space.’(12)

‘Displacement’ too is illustrative of over-determination: one dream phenomenon may appear central to the narrative, to the manifest content, but on closer inspection turns out to represent a transference from the complex of dream-thoughts onto an incidental detail. Freud cites his own dream of his uncle’s ‘fair beard’, which distracts attention from the underlying passion for promotion and status.(13) (See below.)

The account of such devices as condensation and displacement, with recurrent reference to specific dream narratives, fulfils and systematizes the interpretative promise of a Schopenhauer and a Nietzsche; it is the first attempt to spell out the consequences of the discovery of what we might call the contrary self. With Freud, notions such as identity and integrity appear to lose their force; and with them the Diltheyan sequence of expression, objective form and empathy. If the self is permanently divided between the claims of the manifest and latent contents, then hermeneutics cannot rest content with a model of communication and comprehension, but has to engage with the inaccessibly regressive drive of humanity to blind will, to the relentless energy of primitive desire. Freud’s demonstration through dream analysis that narratives do not simply say what the narrator means, but emerge from a conflict of forces, signifies a major shift in exegetical procedure.

Paul Ricouer has summarized the transition as that from ‘interpretation as recollection of meaning’ to ‘interpretation as exercise of suspicion’.(14) In terms of the tradition, it is as if the ‘literal’ or ‘grammatical’ level of meaning has been reduced to the matter of biological drives; and the ‘figurative’ has been released from the restraints of orthodox recuperation. In the terms of post-Enlightenment hermeneutics, it is as if individual ‘divination’ or the inference of ‘life unities’ is exposed as an empty rationalization of the nostalgia for integrity and identity. In Hirsch’s terms, ‘meaning’ can no longer be explained as intention; nor need ‘significance’ be constrained by the ideal of ‘what the author meant’.

 

Freud’s exegesis

Freud tells us in the Interpretation that his patients often resisted the idea that dreams could ultimately be seen as wish-fulfilments, but that he usually managed to persuade them that there were no simple dreams. He gives the example of the young aunt of two small boys, the elder of whom had died at the time when she was being courted by a young academic whom she very much desired to marry. Subsequently the man had broken off relations with her, however. In her dream she saw the younger boy too now lying in a coffin, his hands folded: the atmosphere and images of the dream narrative were reminiscent of the actual death of the elder brother. Freud was able to interpret the apparently straightforward anxiety dream as a disguised wish-fulfilment, in which the death of the younger boy was associated with the return of the suitor. He had been there at the time of the previous death (actually coming to pay his condolences) and so might well be there should another occur. The desire for the lover had been repressed, but the dream gave vent to the underlying wish in disguised form.(15)

Freud also recounts many of his own dreams, and interprets them similarly as resulting from the mechanism of repression. Prior to one such, he had been pleased to learn that he had been nominated for the position of assistant professor at his university. However, one evening soon after a friend had called to say that, though he too had aspirations to that rank, he had been unofficially advised that anti-semitism would ensure he, being a Jew, would not gain promotion. Freud, also a Jew, had therefore resigned himself to the failure of his own ambition. However, that night he had the following dream, in the form of a thought followed by an image:

1. My friend R. was my uncle – I had a great feeling of affection for him.

2. I saw before me his face, somewhat changed. It was as though it had been drawn out lengthways. A yellow beard that surrounded it, stood out especially clearly.(16)

Freud’s only uncle had in fact been a petty criminal at one time. If the friend was associated with the figure of the uncle by way of displacement (‘R.’ had a greying black beard, not a yellow one) then Freud is able to interpret the dream as a vindication of his own wish to be the legitimate candidate for assistant professorship: crime, not race, is now the issue. Moreover, the ‘affection’ he felt in the dream is seen to contribute to the psychic distortion: belonging to the surface narrative but not to the underlying dream-thoughts, it is designed to conceal the reality which interpretation will have to seek in retrospect. It is, in short, a means of disguise: the dream substitutes affection for contempt and so deceives the dreamer. Again, the mechanism of repression has to be uncovered, and the discrepancy between manifest and latent demonstrated.(17)

There are perhaps two ways of describing Freud’s exegesis in the above instances. On the one hand, we might say that it illustrates perfectly the hermeneutical transition which I have sketched in the last section: whatever the dream appears to be saying, analysis reveals distortion and censorship — the consequence of repression — to be at work. Division of the self is assumed, and the text of the dream is read accordingly. Freud thereby releases hermeneutics from the traditional constraints of transparency and recuperation, and in so doing renders exegesis dizzyingly open to infinite textual possibility. He himself spells out the implications for literature:

Just as all neurotic symptoms, and, for that matter, dreams, are capable of being over-interpreted and indeed need to be, if they are to be fully understood, so all genuinely creative writings are the product of more than a single impulse in the poet’s mind, and are open to more than a single interpretation.(18)

On the other hand, in his very expectation of full understanding, he is perfectly capable of making claims for his analysis which simply reproduce the excessive arrogance of positivism: ‘The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind’.(19) Thus the Interpretation might itself be seen as a divided text: on the one hand, immanent exegesis; on the other, despite the protestations in the earlier part of the book, the transcendent perspective of a master-code.

In order to test this tension further, we must examine — in the light of the above pronouncement on ‘creative writings’ — Freud’s account of a specific literary text: namely, Hamlet. Having found in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex evidence that the majority of male children feel desire for the mother and antagonism towards the father, he argues that Shakespeare’s treatment of the Oedipal theme is less direct:

In the Oedipus the child’s wishful phantasy that underlies it is brought into the open and realized as it would be in a dream. In Hamlet it remains repressed; and – just as in the case of a neurosis – we only learn of its existence from its inhibiting consequences.(20)

The reason for this indirectness is given as ‘the secular advance of repression in the emotional life of mankind’.(21) Thus Hamlet, unlike Sophocles’ tragedy, is a play about hesitation, about the arrest of vital impulses through extreme repression of terrifying truths:

Hamlet is able to do anything — except take vengeance on the man who did away with his father and took that father’s place with his mother, the man who shows him the repressed wishes of his own childhood realized. Thus the loathing which should drive him on to revenge is replaced in him by self-reproaches, by scruples of conscience, which remind him that he himself is literally no better than the sinner whom he is to punish.(22)

The inner workings of the narrative are now revealed: the play is structured on the premise of an unrecognized Oedipal impulse or wish. The manifest content of the text may concern the morality of the revenge imperative, but the latent is quite other.

However, Freud does not rest content with the function of the protagonist within the plot, but moves further back to the authorial presence behind the textual form:

… it can of course only be the poet’s mind which confronts us in Hamlet. I observe in a book on Shakespeare by Georg Brandes (1896) a statement that Hamlet was written immediately after the death of Shakespeare’s father (in 1601), that is, under the immediate impact of his bereavement and, as we may well assume, while his childhood feelings about his father had been freshly revived.(23)

It may be that we are once again confronting a division within Freud’s hermeneutical practice. It is one thing to open up a text to new possibilities of significance; it is another to fit the text, in Procrustean manner, into the confines of theory.

The new possibilities discovered by Freud have been challenged by E.D. Hirsch Jr. According to him, the meaning of Hamlet remains what it always was, that is, what the author intended by the sign sequence produced. What is demanded is not biographical conjecture: Hirsch would not, for example, accept the use of dubious information from ‘a book on Shakespeare by Georg Brandes’. Rather, we are to engage with the ‘intrinsic genre’ which defined and facilitated the authorial intention. Thus if Hamlet belongs to the category of Renaissance revenge tragedy, then its meaning is inextricably bound up with generic expectations arising from Shakespeare’s decision to produce that kind of text. It is not valid, Hirsch asserts, to read the plot as if it were about an Oedipus complex, since Oedipal implications do not belong to ‘the type of meaning Shakespeare willed’. ‘He may have willed very broad implications,’ Hirsch concedes — a revenge tragedy will be about more things than revenge – ‘but he did not necessarily will all possible ones’; and we cannot interpret the text indefinitely. To do so is to subordinate ‘meaning’ to ‘significance’.(24)

The confines of Freudian theory have also been challenged, more recently, by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. According to them, the very systematic nature of the ‘complex’ reading (consolidated five years after the Interpretation in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality), inevitably reduces the rich variety of not only the literary text but also the psychic life of the putative patient. Freud’s reading of Hamlet would then be as tyrranous as his analysis of dreams: in both cases, the infinite potential of narrative is translated into an entirely repressive master-code.(25) In Hirsch’s terms, if not in his strict usage, the ‘meaning’ of the Oedipus complex, deemed by Freud to be universal, gathers whatever varieties of ‘significance’ the text possesses into its omnivorous maw.

The above opposed views of Freudian exegesis do not, of course, exhaust the issue. We have still to engage with, for example, Freud’s curious use of biography. I have already indicated that this kind of procedure is proscribed in the hermeneutics of a Schleiermacher, a Dilthey or a Hirsch: the authorial presence is to be located within the text or not at all. But in his interpretation of Hamlet Freud feels no qualms about referring the play back directly to the individual subject and circumstance: it is Shakespeare, after all, to whom is attributed the Oedipal burden. Far less subtle in his handling of the generic work in Shakespeare’s art than in handling the dream-work in the patient’s psyche, he here simply repeats the language of Romantic expressivity, as articulated defiantly by Thomas Carlyle:

How could a man travel forward from rustic deer-poaching to such tragedy-writing, and not fall-in with sorrows by the way? Or, still better, how could a man delineate a Hamlet, a Coriolanus, a Macbeth, so many suffering heroic hearts, if his own heroic heart had never suffered?(26)

In the instance of the Oedipal reading, then, Freudian hermeneutics would take us little further than nineteenth-century biographical criticism. ‘It is known, too, that Shakespeare’s own son who died at an early age bore the name of “Hamnet”, which is identical with “Hamlet”,’ Freud asserts. ‘Just as Hamlet deals with the relation of a son to his parents, so Macbeth [written at approximately the same period] is concerned with the subject of childlessness.'(27)

However, it is in the very next sentence that we are advised of the necessity to ‘over-interpret’ literary texts, since they are ‘the product of more than a single motive and more than a single impulse in the poet’s mind’. Having reduced Hamlet to autobiography, and ratified such a reduction by his own master-code, Freud once more insists on the infinite potential of ‘meaning’, to be complemented on the interpreter’s part by an infinite potential for ‘significance’. Moreover, here in one sentence the author of the Interpretation acknowledges the divided interest of his own text. On the one hand we have the ideal of full understanding, the attempt to discover ‘the poet’s mind’ — what Ricoeur calls the hermeneutics of ‘recollection’; on the other we have the capacity of texts to be ‘over-interpreted’, to attract ‘more than a single interpretation’ — what Ricoeur calls the hermeneutics of ‘suspicion’.

We will look in vain through Freud’s book for a thorough dialectic of ‘recollection’ and  ‘suspicion’, or of ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’. This is because Freud cannot at this stage articulate the full hermeneutical implications of his discoveries, being himself locked into the ‘problematic of the individual subject’.(28) But his symptomatic reading of Hamlet remains crucial for literary criticism in the twentieth century, not because of what it surmises about Shakespeare but because of its readiness to disrupt the text’s reception. ‘Here I have translated into conscious terms what was bound to remain unconscious in Hamlet’s mind; and if anyone is inclined to call him a hysteric, I can only accept the fact as one that is implied by my interpretation.’(29) Crudely mimetic in itself, this revision of critical opinion yet opens up infinite possibilities, not necessarily to be confined by the individual problematic. Six years after the Interpretation, it is Freud himself who gestures towards a truly radical exegesis: in Psychopathic Characters on the Stage he includes Hamlet in that group of plays which rely for their effect on the neurotic in the spectator.(30) The play can then be seen as inducing in the audience the neurosis watched on stage and so, according to a recent account of Freud’s reading, ‘crossing over the boundaries between onstage and offstage and breaking down the habitual barriers of the mind. A particular type of drama, this form is none the less effective only through its capacity to implicate us all …'(31) In his essay Freud quotes Lessing: ‘A person who does not lose his reason under certain conditions can have no reason to lose’.(32) The literary text thus ceases to be an individual case-study and becomes a trans-individual, a cultural, challenge; it does not simply reveal its author but interrogates its readership.

It may be, paradoxically, that a thoroughly Freudian hermeneutics would be one that regained the Diltheyan sense of collective experience, expression and empathy: conscious, of course, that a ‘life unity’ is never stable; nor is it ever what it seems.

 

Notes

1. E.D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967) p. 8.

2. The following account partly derives from these secondary sources: Roy J. Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Rene Marle, Introduction to Hermeneutics (London: Burnes Bates, 1967); Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

3. See The Jerusalem Bible (London: Dayton, Longman and Todd, 1966) p. 53, note d.

4. Fr. D.E. Schleiermacher, ‘The Hermeneutics: Outline of the 1819 Lectures’, trans. Jan Wojcik and Roland Haas, New Literary History X, 1 (Autumn 1978) p. 8.

5. Meaning in History: W. Dilthey’s Thoughts on History and Society, ed. H.P. Rickman (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961) p. 109.

6. See Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studies on Hysteria (1893-95): as in The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. II (London: Hogarth Press, 1955). Subsequent references will be abbreviated as SE.

7. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900): as in SE, Vol. IV, p. 105.

8. SE IV, p. 160.

9. SE V, p. 490. (The Interpretation of Dreams takes up one and a half volumes in the Standard Edition.)

10. See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.J. Payne (New York: Dover Press, 1967).

11. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

12. SE, IV, p. 279.

13. SE, IV, p. 305.

14. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970) pp. 28, 36.

15. SE IV, pp. 152-4.

16. SE IV, p. 137.

17. SE IV, pp. 191-3.

18. SE IV, p. 266. 19. SE V, p. 608. 20. SE IV, p. 264. 21. SE IV, p. 264. 22. SE IV, p. 265. 23. SE IV, p. 265.

24. E.D. Hirsch Jr, op. cit., pp. 78-126.

25. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, The Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977).

26. Thomas Carlyle, ‘The Hero as Poet’, Heroes and Hero-Worship, 1841: as in Christopher Butler and Alistair Fowler (ed.), Topics in Criticism (London: Longman, 1971), quotation 521.

27. SE IV, pp. 265-6.

28. Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (London: Methuen, 1981)
p. 66.

29. SE IV, p. 265.

30. SE VI, pp. 303-10.

31. Jacqueline Rose, ‘Hamlet — the Mona Lisa of Literature’, Critical Quarterly Vol. 28, Nos. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1986) p. 43.

32. SE VII, p. 309.

The Comic Vision of T. F. Powys

Source of picture:
http://tonymusings.blogspot.co.uk/2017/06/on-wine-and-tf-powys.html

 

The Comic Vision of T. F. Powys

Laurence Coupe

The Powys Review, 4, 2 (summer 1984), pp. 72-6

 

Please note that I have made occasional alterations to the phrasing in this article, in the interests of clarity.

 

 

T. F. Powys has suffered not only from neglect but, where attention has been given, from a twofold misapprehension. He was taken up briefly by the critical journal Scrutiny in the thirties; thereafter a consensus somehow emerged that his art was ‘folk’ and ‘tragic’. There having been little challenge to the application of these terms, he is still taken by those who feel no real obligation to read him as a gloomy modern equivalent of Bunyan.

I wish to argue that in terms of both structure and vision Powys is a profoundly comic writer. I do not mean simply that his work contains humorous observations and incidents but that he consciously uses the traditional pattern of comedy, based ultimately on fertility myth and ritual, for his own serious purpose.

Q. D. Leavis did some unwitting damage early on: linking Powys with the rural memoir writer George Sturt, she spoke simply of the rich idiom of ‘the old culture of the English countryside’ as opposed to the ‘inflexible and brutal’ jargon of modern suburban life: spoke of that and of little else.(1) But only a decade ago Raymond Williams felt able to dismiss even such a rich work as Mr. Weston’s Good Wine under the category of ‘regional novel’.(2)

An early booklet-length study of the fiction tells us that we ‘must take account of Powys’s preoccupation with Death.’(3) Thirty years later, with little evidence of any general interest in between, the first full-¬length account of his fiction appears, but only to conclude that ‘he was ultimately a tragic writer’.(4)

The one critical comment on T. F. Powys which, for me at any rate, comes close to apprehending his true spirit is brief and parenthetical, made by William Empson in his account of the development of the pastoral form: ‘his object in writing about country people is to get a simple enough material for his purpose, which one might sum up as a play with Christian imagery backed only by a Buddhist union of God and death.’(5) Here we are at least beyond folk wisdom; and it would be a strange Buddhist who saw anything as tragic other than man’s attempt to resist the fact of mortality.

***

 

We probably all know where the title Mr. Weston’s Good Wine comes from: Emma by Jane Austen. Let us remind ourselves, though, of the specific context. It is chapter 15, where Emma is forced to sit in a two-seater carriage with the odious Mr. Elton as they bid farewell to their evening’s host, Mr. Weston. Emma’s interest in the clergyman has hitherto amounted only to plotting his marriage to her young protegee Harriet Weaver. Otherwise she finds him simply tiresome, and now she is rightly apprehensive: ‘She believed he had been drinking too much of Mr. Weston’s good wine, and felt sure that he would want to be talking nonsense.’ Far worse than this occurs though: Mr. Elton seizes Emma by the hand and begins making violent protestations of love to her.

Emma, of course, belongs to the narrative genre which we call comedy: not merely because of its author’s sense of humour but also, and more importantly, because of its structure. From the Roman dramatists Plautus and Terence and from Shakespeare we know that structure to be based on a move from ignorance to knowledge, frustration to fulfilment, isolation to identity. Emma, once she has understood the error of her presumption, may marry Mr. Knightley. The episode to which we have referred offers one illustration of that crucial period of sexual confusion which precedes the triumph of harmony.(6)

T. F. Powys, who knew Sir James Frazer’s pioneering work of cultural anthropology, The Golden Bough, very well, would have understood that comedy ultimately — Jane Austen’s included — derives from fertility myth and ritual. It is essentially about the tension between winter and spring, death and life. Just as in tragedy the fertility god disappears and in a sense dies, so in comedy he revives and reappears to be restored to the fertility goddess. Whether we know that god as Dionysus, Adonis or Tammuz, we say the original power is that of Eros.

On the psychoanalytical level also, the structure of comedy is clearly erotic: the drive towards the union of lover and beloved. Hence nothing — even the author, unless he wishes to make a display of being ironic — is allowed to prevent the sexual realization at the end, no matter how deep and intractable the period of confusion at the centre of the play or novel. Unlike normal life, art may present us with the triumph of the pleasure over the reality principle.

Here we are obviously invoking the work of Sigmund Freud. But if we take death itself to be the ultimate reality with which we must come to terms, we may see Freud in his later work as coming to see sexuality and mortality as complementary rather than antagonistic. That is, he  suggested that all behaviour is an attempt to release tension: a release which may seem be temporarily attained by means of sexual activity but which is only final in death. In that sense Thanatos comprehends Eros.

***

All this may seem a long way from fiction which has seemed to most critics a folksy by-product of English literature. Let us be clear about what exactly happens in Mr. Weston’s Good Wine.

I think that it is fair to say that Mr. Weston, the benevolent old wine merchant, is God; and his assistant Michael is the archangel of the same name. They come in their Ford car to the village of Folly Down with a list of potential customers. In order to sell their product they stop all the clocks at seven in the evening: time gives way to eternity. There are two wines; or rather, the wine is of two strengths: the lighter one is that of love, the darker that of death. As Mr. Weston himself says, his wine is ‘as strong as death and as sweet as love’. Love and death, Eros and Thanatos, are described by Powys elsewhere as ‘the two great realities’.

So the central symbol of the book is wine. But an attendant one is that of the spreading oak tree and its mossy bed beneath. Here various virgins, procured by the evil Mrs. Vosper, are seduced by Martin and John, the sons of Squire Mumby. One such was Ada Kiddle, who subsequently drowned herself: she drank the dark wine of Thanatos. The blame for all such sin is attributed by the village to the sexton, Mr. Grunter: he is Adam, still attempting to act as if he were in Eden, seeing no shame in his reputation (which he rather enjoys).

Customers for the light wine include Luke Bird and Jenny Bunce, who are given to each other in marriage and so testify to the power of Eros. ‘To be happy with another, in all the excitement and the glamour of the spring, is the proper thing to do. Luke longed in his heart to commit, to rejoice in the commital of, the most wanton excesses of love.’ But there are others who yearn to succumb to Thanatos, notably the vicar Mr. Grobe, who lost his faith after the death of his wife. His daughter Tamar, who is obsessed by the possibility of an angelic lover, is finally carried off into the skies by Michael himself: in her fulfilment Eros and Thanatos are shown to be one.

An important part of Mr. Weston’s task is to bring the Mumby sons to repentance. Having revealed his true identity to Grunter, he leads John and Martin to the graveyard, where they expect to find his good wine but where the sexton has unearthed Ada Kiddle:

‘My good wine, gentlemen,’ said Mr. Weston.

Though the worms had destroyed Ada’s beauty, her shape was still there, and Mr. Grunter regarded her compassionately. He saw Ada as if she were a picture, which is the way that all wise countrymen regard the world or anything in it that seems a little curious or out of the common …

‘You are a liar and a cheat,’ Martin shouted at the wine merchant. ‘You promised us wine, and you show us the rotted corpse of a whore. Is this your wine?’

Mr. Weston said nothing.(7)

Powys may perhaps be dismissed as having a morbid, even a sadistic streak (consider his story ‘The Baked Mole’). But to do so is to miss his real thematic interest: not a passing attention to sexual life as a sort of spice by which to relish all the more the fear of death but a realization of the final identity of the two great realities of Eros and Thanatos.

At the close of the novel, Mr. Weston himself is ready to drink the strong wine of death: he orders Michael to set fire to the car:

Michael did as he was told. In a moment a fierce tongue of flame leaped up from the car; a pillar of smoke rose above the flame and ascended into the heavens. The fire died down, smouldered, and went out.

Mr. Weston was gone.(8)

The Biblical associations are hard to ignore. Yet throughout the novel their persistence has not overridden the profane, rural idiom which pleased Mrs. Leavis; and of course its strength has to be acknowledged, without making the mistake of justifying the novel solely on such terms.

What is more pertinent is to demonstrate the way in which the ‘folk’ idiom is informed by the spiritual dimension; or conversely the way in which that dimension is substantiated by that idiom. Consider the moment at which Grunter (Adam) recognizes Mr. Weston (God):

‘I have work for you to do, John Grunter,’ he said.

‘And who be thee to command folk?’ asked the clerk.

Mr. Weston uncovered his head and looked at him. Until that moment he had kept on his hat.

‘Who be thee?’ asked Mr. Grunter in a lower tone …

‘I know thee now,’ said Mr. Grunter.

‘Then tell no man,’ said Mr. Weston.

Mr. Grunter looked happy; he even grinned.

‘I did fancy at first,’ he said, in a familiar tone, ‘that thee was the devil, and so I did walk down church aisle behind ‘ee to see if thee’s tail did show.’(9)

Mr. Weston’s disappearance at the end of the novel is clearly not a touch of homely whimsy: God enters into the death which he has created; or, following Empson, God and death are shown to be identical. We may be reminded of an earlier tale by Powys, ‘The Only Penitent’, in which Tinker Jar (God) asks Mr. Hayhoe (Adam) for forgiveness for creating all the evils of the world and in particular for allowing his own only son to be crucified. Mr. Hayhoe is only able to grant it because his effort to counter Jar’s confession with a reminder of the good things in the world — love included — fails in the face of Jar’s reminder of the fact of individual annihilation. That is why Mr. Hayhoe has finally to forgive Jar: he invented death. It is God we must thank for death.

Mr. Weston’s Good Wine is not, then, a tragedy in any acceptable sense. True, it concentrates to a large extent on the aftermath of the death of Ada Kiddle — though that death has taken place before the story begins. True, Mr. Grobe and his daughter accept the darker wine; but there is no sense of protest or loss. Where death is presented not as the terrible contradiction of life and love but as their realization, ‘tragedy’ is not an appropriate term. This book is in fact a comedy in the sense that it follows the structure of pagan fertility myth, involving the ever-recurrent springtime victory of life over death; Powys simply accepts that the corresponding autumnal victory of death over life is not a fate to be feared but a comic resolution more desirable even than that of love.

Given this emphasis it is not surprising that he makes constant allusion to another book, profoundly comic in structure, which long before that of T. F. Powys resolves in its own way the dichotomy between love and death: I mean the Christian Bible.

In traditional Christian theology there is an inextricable link between sexual love and the fact of death. Put simply, angels do not breed; they are immortal and immaterial. Only fallen man, with the animals, must reproduce his kind and so attempt an immortality of generation. According to St. Augustine, Adam and Eve enjoyed a sexless joy in Eden, but after the fall they entered into a world of individual death and birth, death and birth . . . and so a world of sex. Thus T. F. Powys presents us with the image of the mossy oak tree bed on which both wines are drunk. The possibility of such identity — sex and death as one — gives his language its paradoxical force. This brings him close not so much to Bunyan as to Shakespeare (Lear’s ‘I will die like a smug bridegroom’) and Donne (‘A bracelet of bright hair about the bone’).

Again, in Unclay John Death is sent by God to gather up Joseph Bridle and Susie Dawe, but loses his parchment of names and so spends the whole summer resting from his usual labour of ‘scything’ and finds delight in love. As he explains to the parson’s wife:

‘When a deathly numbness overcomes a body, when the flesh corrupts, and the colour of the face is changed in the grave, then I have done for a man more than love can do, for I have changed a foolish and unnatural craving into everlasting content. In all the love feats, I take my proper part. When a new life begins to form in the womb, my seeds are there, as well as Love’s. We are bound together in the same knot. I could be happy lying with you now, and one day you will be glad to lie with me.’(10)

It is to miss the point, as does H. Coombes, to protest that there is too little distinction drawn in this novel between the erotic and the morbid intrigues of the protagonist.

As we have suggested earlier, in the later Freud also we find identity where others –the earlier Freud included — have seen conflict. Eros and Thanatos have a common end; or rather the final fulfilment of Eros is in Thanatos. Hence Powys’s fiction, which owes as much to Freud as to St Augustine, amounts to an interrogation of the comic structure and in doing so offers us a new comic vision. In the major novels — Mr. Weston and Unclay — as in Fables and the more realistic stories such as ‘Lie Thee Down, Oddity! – the final victory is not over death but over fear of death. Death is truly a consummation devoutly to be wished.

Hence T. F. Powys is no disciple of Nietzsche: he sees the eternal recurrence of individual birth, experience and death as acceptable only because the recurrence is not eternal for the individual. He is closer to Swift: nothing strikes him as worse than the fate of the immortal Struldbruggs. Life is only possible given death; death is the very form of life. The difference from Swift is that for Powys a positive emerges: we begin to live only when we know we will die.

But to return to the Christian perspective: Coombes’s book contains page after page of conjecture as to whether T. F. Powys was an orthodox believer. Perhaps such efforts miss the mark: what matters more is to see how he adapts the language of orthodox belief to his own ends.

The good wine that Mr. Weston brings to Folly Down must surely remind us of that drunk at the last supper by Jesus. The early Christians, conscious of that event, understood that their communion, their affirmation of community in the person of the risen Christ, must involve the sharing of wine. The term for such an occasion was ‘Agape’ or ‘love feast’, from the Greek word for spiritual love. Scriptural commentators often suggest that Agape is something opposed to Eros, but strictly speaking it comprehends it. It also comprehends Thanatos, since what makes the love feast possible is the conviction that death, the last enemy, is no longer a threat given the resurrection of Christ.

What T. F. Powys does is to work within the language of orthodox Christian belief but without subscribing to its premises. It is not so much that he agrees with Nietzsche that God is dead but that he agrees with Schopenhauer (and so with the Buddhism of Empson’s aside) that God is death.

When Luke Bird and Jenny Bunce drink the lighter wine, and find fulfilment in Eros, they enjoy a foretaste of the darker wine of Thanatos, of the final mature acknowledgement of the fact that we are born to die. The comedy of T. F. Powys is Christian in structure; but what matters is the way he draws on Christian mythology in order to explore the depths of the human psyche and to reveal the spiritual succour it can draw from aligning itself with the natural order.

With most writers it is difficult, or impossible, to deduce a vision from a structure. The author of King Lear is not necessarily a cosmic pessimist; after all he is also author of All’s Well That Ends Well. But Powys is the exception who proves the rule. We may wince when we come across gift books containing the ‘wit and wisdom’ of Shakespeare, Samuel Johnson and others. Powys, though, is one of the few writers who does seem to insist that we consider the beauty of his art to be its truth. Thus we can we imagine a gift book, admittedly not one that everybody would find congenial, in which we find the following from Unclay:

When the sun of Love rises, and a man walks in glory, he may be sure that a shadow approaches him — Death.

Love creates and separates; Death destroys and heals.(11)

With the publication last year of R. P. Graves’s The Brothers Powys, we may hope that a revival of interest in the brother Theodore is due. This article is written in the hope that that revival will necessitate a serious revaluation, not another invitation to savour the rustic gloom of a literary eccentric. For T. F. Powys’s art, like Mr. Weston’s wine, is truly ‘as strong as death and as sweet as love’.

 

Notes

1 Q. D. Leavis, Fiction and the Reading Public (London: Chatto and Windus, 1932; repr. Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 170.

2 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (London: Chatto and Windus, 1973; repr. St. Albans: Paladin, 1975), p. 302.

3 William Hunter, The Novels and Stories of T. F. Powys (London: Gordon Frazer, , 1930; repr. Beckenham: Trigon Press, 1977), p. 14.

4 H. Coombes, T. F. Powys (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), p. 157.

5 William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (London: Chatto and Windus, 1935; repr. 1979), p. 7.

6 See Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

7 T. F. Powys, Mr. Weston’s Good Wine (London: Chatto and Windus, London, 1927; repr. 1975), p. 292.

8 Ibid., p. 316.

9 Ibid., p. 262.

10 T. F. Powys, Unclay (London: Chatto and Windus,1931), p. 325.

11 Ibid., p. 57.

 

 

Edgell Rickword: Modernist or Marxist?

Edgell Rickword: Modernist or Marxist?

Laurence Coupe

Stand, 22, 3 (Summer 1981), pp.38-43

Note: This is a slightly revised version of the original review-article.

 

Essays and Opinions 1921-31, Carcanet

Literature in Society: Essays and Opinions 1931-78, Carcanet

Behind the Eyes: Collected Poems and Translations, Carcanet

 

There are two Edgell Rickwords. There is what we might call the ‘Pelican Guide’ Edgell Rickword, the man who edited the magazine that inspired Scrutiny and ‘Eng. Lit.’ as we know it — The Calendar of Modern Letters — but who came to nothing after making the mistake of taking Marx seriously. Now, at last, thanks to Carcanet, we can see the other Edgell Rickword: a leading poet and critic of the twenties whose political development was in keeping with the character and talent of the man; the Marxism complements the Modernism.

Rickword’s preoccupation has always been the need to assert and explore the rich potential of the individual mind, as something threatened by the sterile anxieties of our age — or, as Alan Young puts it in his introduction to the first volume of essays, ‘the struggle in art and in society between the free intellect and the dead convention’. It is because the individual matters that society must be changed.

Born in Colchester in 1898, Rickword received a conventional grammar-school education, was con¬verted early to socialism, and fought in the First World War (receiving the Military Cross). He briefly read French at Oxford (leaving after four terms because the course stopped before Baudelaire), began reviewing for the Times Literary Supplement and the New Statesman, wrote the first critical study in English of the poet Rimbaud (1924), and edited The Calendar of Modern Letters (1925-27). Having produced three important volumes of verse (1925, 1928, 1931) he joined the Communist Party and worked for Left Review in the thirties, completing the decade with a seminal Marxist study of Milton. He helped edit the journal Our Time throughout the Second World War, and has since been undertaking a complete revaluation of the English radical tradition.

Rickword’s early writings emerge from the aftermath of war. Having lain ‘in sodden trenches’ alongside his fellow soldiers

and loved them for the stubbornness that clings
longest to laughter when Death’s pulleys creak

he is appalled to see them now ride

… silent on the train
to old-man stools; or sell gay-coloured socks
and listen fearfully for Death …

And in his prose too he resists the post-war vacuity, calling for a new sense of the individual that, as it gained mythological breadth and depth, would facilitate a new social cohesion: called for a Hero, in other words:

A Hero would seem to be due, an exhaustively disillusioned Hero (we could not put up with another new creed) who has yet so much vitality that his thoughts seize all sorts of analogies between apparently unrelated objects and so create an unbiased but self-consistent, humorous universe for himself …

and so for us. The poems, dedicated to this figure, are a protest against, not our ‘dissociation of sensibility’ as understood by Rickword’s contemporary, T. S. Eliot, but our alienation as understood by Karl Marx:

and the I retreating down familiar paths
rears its defence against the terrible sun and in its figurative way rebuilds the altar and brothel of legitimate state
adjacent, with mean fanes darkening our streets.

Rickword, says Jack Lindsay, depicts the capitalist city as ‘hell itself objectified on earth in loneliness amidst crowds, frustration amidst expansion’.(1) So we read:

Deprived of freedom in time, space and love
they seek enfranchisement in the air beyond
the city’s silent rows of gnawing roofs,
expecting joy within the mouth of doom …

 

In 1925, Rickword outlines his plans for a complete ‘Re-creation of Poetry’. Tired of the ‘social queasiness’ that inhibits him from expressing what he calls the ‘negative’ emotions — a significant part of himself, that is — he asks what has become of the ‘fact of personality’ and the transformation of this material into art. The briskness of tone here, the scientific deliberateness – ‘fact’ – is as clearly tactical as Eliot’s comparison of poetic composition to a chemical reaction (see his essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’), but with a different end in view. Rickword is adopting the language of 19th century positivism in order to facilitate a Modernist, anti-positivist, poetic. But the immediate enemy is the inheritance of 19th century poetry itself:

An effect of the triumph of the romantic movement in the last century has been to separate the poet from the subjects which abound in ordinary social life and particularly from those emotions engendered by the clash of personality and the hostility of circumstances.

Thus, Rickword’s theory is clearly at odds with that of Eliot, who speaks of the extinction of personality, continual self-sacrifice. That said, they have more in common than their choice of vocabulary suggests: the refusal to reduce literature to mere self-expression. Having conceded that affinity, however, we must note Rickword’s resistance against the full severity of Eliot’s formulation of ‘impersonality’. Hence we find him making a plea for a process analogous to the dramatic catharsis:

A poem must, at some point or another, release, enable to flow back to the level of active life, the emotions caught up from life and pent in the aesthetic reservoir. Otherwise the poem is an artifice, a wax effigy in a glass case, a curiosity.

It is a critical commonplace that Eliot’s poetry, despite his own early protestations, was always highly personal and idiosyncratic, sustained by a characteristically neurotic energy – which is not to say that he did not find what he elsewhere called an ‘objective correlative’ appropriate to the particular emotion he wished to
communicate.

Rickword gets it right in his own review of Eliot’s Collected Poems, again in 1925. We are impressed, he says, on the one hand by ‘the urgency of the personality’ which comes close to breaking through ‘the aesthetic fabric’, and on the other by ‘the technique which spins that fabric’:

for it is by his struggle with technique that Mr. Eliot has been able to get closer than any other poet to the physiology of our sensations (a poet does not speak merely for himself) to explore and make palpable the more intimate distresses of a generation for whom all the romantic escapes had been blocked.

That parenthetical aphorism is Rickword’s own guiding principle: ‘a poet does not speak merely for himself’. And when he came to reject Eliot, it was because of the latter’s increasing disregard for that responsibility to his generation which was at least implicit in the very ideal of ‘impersonality’. In the pages of Eliot’s own journal The Criterion, which offered hospitality to a variety of right-wing Christian thinkers, Rickword saw ‘impersonality’ become ‘orthodoxy’, individual talent weighed down by scholastic tradition, while the criticism itself became rhetoric – the rhetoric of reaction, elitism, contempt.

Contempt is a ‘negative emotion’ associated with the name of Jonathan Swift, to whom Rickword points as a master of the sort of poetry required today. But he is quite clear, in a separate and later essay on Swift, that this contempt is at the service of a larger, more generous emotion and endeavour:

… it is not some inherent, ineradicable beastliness in individual men and women, as the bourgeois critics prefer to see it, which is the object of his magnificent fury, but the irresponsibility of man towards man which results when every item of personal worth has been translated into ‘exchange value’.

Rickword ‘re-creates’ Swift’s invective in his own poetry, for example, his ‘Hints for Making a Gentleman’:

Let library shelves sustain from reach
the facts experience may teach;
and Swift and Schopenhauer be banned
past grasp of most inquiring hand;
such pessimists are all suspect
for they may teach him to correct
the blind insurgent ego-lust
that goads this paladin of dust
and gives him in his rage for pelf
rule of all creatures but himself.

In his prose ‘Apology for Yahoos’ (written for The Calendar) Rickword offers an ironically anthropological account – Gulliver having written ‘before the observation of primitive races had been developed into a science’ – of modern society’s faith in ‘Love’’ and ‘Law’. These principles he sees as derived from its obsession with ‘Luxury’, the process of ‘eliminating the physical reminders of their animal origin’.

Rickword’s regard for Swift may seem excessively high. Would he not have done better to look to Pope for guidance, as possessing the greater balance, the finer humanity? This is a wide debate, not to be settled here. What we can say is that Swift demonstrated for Rickword the possibilities of a political, anti-capitalist poetry. In this emphasis, he anticipates the revaluation of tradition suggested, much later, by the scholar-critic F. W. Bateson:

It is time Swift’s status as a poet was reconsidered. Although his verse is uneven and often slipshod, at his best he seems to me to be one of the great English poets. I prefer him to Pope. Pope is a supreme talker in verse, endlessly vivacious and amusing, but it is difficult to take him or his opinions very seriously … Swift, on the other hand, though he restricted himself to light verse, is fundamentally one of the world’s most serious poets.(2)

 

Before he came to Swift, or re-asserted the ‘negative emotions’, Rickword discovered, independently of Eliot, the Metaphysicals. In his own verse, he is particularly close to Donne – and a long way from Eliot. Here is his witty celebration of the interplay between mind and matter, imagination and reality, drawing on an ingenious religious conceit, as articulated in the opening lines of ‘To the Sun and Another Dancer’:

The sun that lightened the first Easter Day
traced in the arc of his familiar way
the choreography of Resurrection,
which works on our world now, the true reflection
whereby the sun-foot dancer draws the dead
out of the sepulchre of formless dread;
and as the sun still seems to our slow wit
to attend on us when we derive from it
all vital qualities, these verses show
no revelation you did not bestow.

Rickword, at his best, effects a Modernist transformation of Donne’s Metaphysical grammar. Roy Fuller was right to remind us that ‘one would miss the full flavour of a couplet like the following if one hadn’t in mind the then current discussions about the essentially random nature of the motion of particles’.(3) Here it is:

Dawn is a miracle each night debates,
which faith may prophesy but luck dictates

We need only add that the reference does not, of course, explain the freshness of the language.

Seventeenth century Metaphysicals (English), eighteenth century satirists (English) … and now we come to nineteenth century Symbolists (French). Rickword’s desire to keep the past alive in the present, for the future, was as keen as Eliot’s. But where Eliot began identifying himself with Charles Baudelaire, and in particular with his sense of sin (‘Baudelaire was man enough for damnation’), Rickword was increasingly convinced of the genius of a later poet, an extreme ‘Symbolist’, Arthur Rimbaud. Few people in 1924 were concern¬ing themselves with that adolescent genius when Rickword produced his critical study, Rimbaud: The Boy and the Poet (extracts are included in the first volume of essays, the translations are in Behind the Eyes); now, of course, his reputation is secure, though as challenging as ever.

What is remarkable about the book in retrospect is that though, as one might expect from an exploratory volume, it dwells on Rimbaud’s precocious ‘Messianism’ (since taken up to his disadvantage), there is strong emphasis on the poet’s social awareness and on his political concerns (the cause of the Paris Commune in particular). Enid Starkie’s apparently exhaustive account of the poet’s career, written fourteen years later, insufficiently documents Rimbaud’s absorption in the utopian socialism of his day.

It is not possible to illustrate neatly the part played by his adopted genius in the formation of Rickword’s style: you can spot more easily his influence on Hart Crane, whom Rickword evidently converted to Rimbaud. What is important is to recognise a general determination to rescue language and thought from the mercilessly platitudinous logic that we are taught to call ‘common sense’, and which ultimately denies life:

… and women grown
too docile under habits not their own;
bright incarnations damned to trivial calls
like shirted angels nailed to bedroom walls;
and all tense lives subdued to what they seem,
shed their coarse husks and, naked in Time’s stream,
stand up unsullied out of the sun’s beam.

It was Rimbaud’s radical contempt for ‘dead convention’, artistic or social, which Rickword found congenial, and which Eliot may have found ‘heretical’.

For, though Rickword was the first critic to praise or even understand Eliot, he was also a fierce opponent of that tendency to reaction which revealed itself in the pages of the latter’s journal The Criterion: Eliot’s praise for Mosley, Pound’s advocacy of Mussolini, general Bloomsbury snobbery and, as already mentioned, right-wing theological debates. Too all of this Rickword meant The Calendar to be an antidote. Throughout his journal’s duration he was a socialist – giving his wholehearted support to the general strike of 1926 – and by the following decade he was a committed communist.

It is possible to see Rickword’s Marxism as some¬thing extraneous, perverse even: an abandonment of artistic integrity, something to be apologised for. This would be unfair. The Calendar had been a literary magazine with a political emphasis; Left Review was a political magazine that encouraged progressive literature. In his essay ‘Culture, Progress, and the English Tradition’, Rickword reminds us that the politically active writers of the thirties are only following the example set by Milton, Swift, Words¬worth … and he might have added Cobbett and Hazlitt (there are studies of all five included in Literature and Society). Not that Rickword’s Marxism is a vulgar, sterile application of economic theory to artistic practice. He castigates Philip Henderson for just that:

Society was feudal, it became bourgeois, it is going to be socialist – so much he knows; but of the interplay of the classes, the dialectical relationship between them, which is the law of humanity in motion, he realises nothing, or at any rate, does not apply it to the subject matter in front of him.

Nor is he indulgent of those ‘public- school’ Marxists who put his critical successor F. R. Leavis off Marxism, pointing out ill¬-considered language in Auden’s ‘Spain’ — ‘the flat ephemeral pamphlet and the boring meeting’; and his own poem on the Spanish civil war, ‘To the Wife of a Non-interventionist Statesman’, urgent and serious, contrasts favourably with Auden’s aloof weariness:

From small beginnings mighty ends,
from calling rebel general friends,
from being taught in public schools
to think the common people fools,
Spain bleeds, and England wildly gambles
to bribe the butcher in the shambles …
Five hundred dead at ten a second
is the world record so far reckoned;
a hundred children in one street,
their little hands and guts and feet,
like offal round a butcher’s stall
scattered where they were playing ball …

Yet on the whole it is the early Auden — socially responsible Modernism — that comes closest to Rickword’s ideal. Thus he complains, as the younger writer goes into retreat:

Auden is too good a poet to fall back into the simple exploration of individuality, after having originated a poetry of the social type along the lines of which there are so many fertile experiments to be made.

 

Rickword’s criticism in the thirties is as immediately concerned with contemporary creation as that in the twenties. Yet he himself, apart from the poem on Spain, produced no more verse for thirty-odd years. It would be misleading, I think, to see his renunciation of poetic speech as evidence of a disillusionment with either art or life. ‘A poet’, Rickword had said, ‘does not speak merely for himself’: it is not helpful to say, with the finality of jargon, that the Modernist poet became the Marxist functionary, any more than to say of Rimbaud that the Faustian genius became the mere gun¬runner’. As Michael Schmidt remarks of Rickword’s development:

Some of his critics believe that Marxism was responsible for his giving up poetry. And yet, without the development of his social conscience, his poetry would hardly have attained the commitment, range, and power that it did, before he moved beyond it.(4)

To assume the primacy of poetic praxis over political is to surrender to the empty idealism that Rickword has consistently opposed: an idealism that would ultimately prefer art to life, spirit to matter, idea to action, word to deed. However much we may regret the loss to English poetry involved in his decision, we must surely admire the struggle of a committed individual for integrity, totality, and against alienation, to which an ostensibly divided career — poet, critic, polemicist — bears ironic witness.

 

Notes

1 Jack Lindsay, After the Thirties, London, 1956, p.23

2 F. W. Bateson, English Poetry: A Critical Introduction, London, 1950, p.123

3 Roy Fuller, Professors and Gods, London, 1973, p.36

4 Michael Schmidt, Fifty Modern British Poets, London, 1979, p.187

Three books on American poetry

Critical Quarterly 27, 4 (December 1985), pp 88-90

 

A. Robert Lee (ed.), Nineteenth-Century American Poetry (Barnes & Noble)

R. W. Butterfield, Modern American Poetry (Barnes & Noble)

Alan Williamson, Introspection and Contemporary Poetry (Harvard University Press)

 

 

The first two of these volumes belong to the ‘Critical Studies’ series of symposia on American literature. The general aim seems to be an admixture of summa¬tion and stimulus; here the contributors, many of whom teach at the Univer¬sities of Essex and Kent, have opted chiefly for the latter. Their critical judgements have the air of intervening in a discourse of received opinion.

The hard-pressed undergraduate need not be too anxious, however. Each editor offers a brief opening perspective on the period and the poetry about to be reinterpreted. Of the two introductions it is Butterfield’s which says more in less space. In essence, he tells us, the history of modern American poetry may be explained as a triadic tension: that between ‘America’, ‘the poem’ and ‘the self’. If he is tentative about referring each of these to a particular formative figure, it is because he wants to encourage the student to discover how subtly the elements have ‘conjoined’ over the years. He strongly hints, though, at Whitman, Poe and Dickinson respectively.

Lee, while less comprehensive, is more encouraging about tracing origins and lines. Excluding Butterfield’s middle term, poetry per se, he takes as his matrix a binary opposition between ‘public’ and ‘private’, ‘American identity’ and ‘singular identity’ — thus enabling him to speak of a continuity between Whitman and Olson and between Dickinson and Plath. But again, the reader is warned: American literary inheritance is, we must never forget, a ‘complex fate’.

Lee’s volume thus offers two varying readings of Whitman: one (by Eric Mottram) as ‘public’ prophet and another (by Mark Kinkead-Weekes) as ‘private’ lyricist. Within one essay on Dickinson, Jim Philip attends both to the New England and Puritan context and to the personal courage implicit in the power of the verse. Of the remaining contributions, Robert von Hallberg’s account of Poe invites attention, precisely because it might be expected to evade the editor’s paradigm; yet here again, if ‘American identity’ and ‘singular identity’ are briefly overshadowed by a theory of pure poetry, this in itself is soon explained as Poe’s own challenge to English cultural hegemony.

The main link between the two ‘Critical Studies’ volumes is provided by Graham Clarke. Concluding Nineteenth-Century American Poetry, he demonstrates how Whitman and others, parallel to East Coast landscape painting and in keeping with Emerson’s philosophy of Transcendentalism, worked towards an ‘ideal realism’: that is, a formal achievement whereby the self was able to ‘read’ America as God’s ‘text’, as ‘a literal prospect which signified an implicit mythical dimension’. To regain ‘this “true” meaning, this original image’, it was necessary to ‘establish an aesthetic freed from entrapping conventions and traditions which stood between the eye and its divine object’. Then, in the middle of Modern American Poetry, Clarke tells us that Olson’s ‘insistence on origins’, his search for ‘the original moment of naming’ (the spoken act, taken to precede the word as written form) is a way of reasserting and revivifying the initial Emersonian impulse. This, it seems, is how to make sense also of Williams, and even Crane (as demonstrated by Jim Philip and Jeremy Reed). But it proves an uncongenial context for Wallace Stevens: we find Richard Gray referring him back almost apologetically to English Romanticism rather than American Transcendentalism.

English Romanticism is just where Alan Williamson unreservedly begins. Indeed, in the introduction to Introspection and Contemporary Poetry, a study of the American scene of the past twenty-five years, he quotes an English Romantic — ‘we receive but what we give, / And in our life alone does Nature live’ — to such effect that it makes one wonder why Lee and Butterfield did not go to more pains to explain where exactly the Emersonian self and nature depart from the Coleridgean. There is a danger that even the diligent student might come away from their volumes thinking that the main difference is America itself, where self and nature evidently come in bigger sizes.

Leaving the peculiar advantages of his country aside, then, Williamson, Professor of English at the University of California, attends rather to the way certain of its recent poets have related to the Romantic faith. He devotes much of his time to work which, though attributed to a tradition by Lee, is virtually neglected by Butterfield: the ‘confessional’ poetry of Lowell and Plath. True, Gabriel Pearson does discuss the former in Modern American Poetry but, con¬fining himself to For Lizzie and Harriet, deems Lowell guilty of exhibitionism; Plath is not mentioned once throughout the whole volume. Williamson himself, however, is by no means interested in straightforward self-expression. ‘Confessionalism’, he assures us, is only valid where it involves a ‘reflexive mode’, a constant turning round upon the self, an insistence on its responsibility to common humanity and the world. Lowell’s The Dolphin and Plath’s Ariel would seem to fulfil this requirement.

But the poet central to Williamson’s argument — that the best poetry of the last twenty-five years is about ‘the sense of being or having a self, a knowable personal identity’– is not ‘confessional’ at all. Ashbery is one of those who have reacted against the rhetorical excesses of his introspective predecessors, but he is not finally to be identified with the impersonal surrealism of his peers, Merwin and Strand. Admitting that our experience of the world is arbitrary and largely superficial, and that the self cannot be disengaged from that experience for purposes of diagnosis, he yet indicates (to Williamson at least) that meaning may exist in the very capacity of the self to embrace its chaos.

Thus we are brought back to Romanticism: if not Coleridge’s then Keats’s certainly. ‘Negative capability’ is not, one suspects, what Butterfield would have wanted any contributor of his to find in Ashbery. But Williamson makes a good case, and his book (difficult going as it sometimes is) may be recommended as an extension of, and a partial corrective to, both these usefully provocative ‘Critical Studies’ volumes.

 

Laurence Coupe

See also …

See also…

 

# ‘Green Studies’ page:

‘Genesis and the Nature of Myth’

 

# ‘The Beats’ page:

‘A Quest for Place: Gary Snyder’s Search for a Living Myth’

 

# ‘Kenneth Burke’ page:

Words and the Word: Kenneth Burke’s Logology and T. S. Eliot’s Mythology’

 

# ‘Selected Reviews from PNR and CQ’ page:

‘The Story So Far’

Myth: A Very Short Introduction

A useful guide to the interpretation of myth

Religion 38 (2008), pp 77-78

Robert A. Segal, Myth: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004)

 

Robert Segal is a world authority on the theory of myth, having written several scholarly treatises on the subject, and having launched and maintained a series of studies of particular theorists (his own study of Joseph Campbell forming the first volume). Though his reputation has been largely academic, his clarity of style and his capacity for summary make him particularly appropriate as a guide to the world of myth for the non-academic reader as well as the undergraduate student. He refuses to mystify a subject which seems to invite mystification.

In this accessible volume in a useful series of ‘short introductions’ (ranging from Aristotle to Derrida, from ancient philosophy to postmodernism), Segal begins by stating his case as simply as possible. He tells us that there are three basic questions to be asked concerning myth: what is its origin? what is its function? what is its subject-matter? He suggests that, in practice, most theorists fail to answer all three questions. For example, Rudolf Bultmann concentrates on subject-matter (the place of human beings in the world), while Bronislaw Malinowski concentrates on function (the sanctioning of customs). Segal further argues that theories of myth are theories of some category wider than myth — society, nature, and so on. This being the case, we had best be on our guard against theorists who purport to provide a ‘key to all mythologies’ (George Eliot’s phrase, not Segal’s): whatever that theorist claims, s/he will inevitably have assembled the evidence to suit the theory; the interpretation of the myth will be some to extent partisan. Segal’s scepticism towards theories of myth makes him a dispassionate guide to myth itself, particularly as he abstains from offering any meta-theory himself – though he does end by endorsing the ideas of D. W. Winnicott as offering a firm basis for future study.

The structure of the book makes it accessible in two main ways. First, the use of one myth – that of Adonis – as a focus for all the theories discussed is helpful to readers who might otherwise feel bewildered and overawed by the sheer diversity of mythic narratives. People who are likely to read this book will have some familiarity with this popular tale, and will find the exposition of the variety of possible readings to be fascinating.

Second, starting off the survey of theories with the category of ‘Myth and Science’ allows for a logical progression of topics. For Segal’s claim is that most twentieth-century views of myth are responses to the nineteenth-century challenge that myth has been superseded by science and is no longer relevant. Hence we are guided through the various attempts to justify myth in modernity – for example, by identifying it with religious wisdom (Mircea Eliade) or by celebrating it as the source of literature (Northrop Frye). Most audacious of all these attempts is that which focuses on what a given story might reveal about the human mind itself: myth, that is, is seen as expressive of the unconscious (Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Joseph Campbell). But Segal takes us further, covering other, less well-known justifications of myth: in relation to linguistic structure (Claude Levi-Strauss, Georges Dumezil) and also in relation to social order (George Sorel, Rene Girard).

By virtue of both these devices – that is, taking the same myth and giving it different readings, and charting the way a theoretical challenge has been met – Segal ensures that the book covers a great deal of ground without wandering off down too many byways.

Specific criticisms might be made, of course. For example, Chapter 5, ‘Myth and literature’, correctly foregrounds Frye’s seminal work, but perhaps forces Girard into the picture, particularly as his theory has by Segal’s admission limited applicability to the Adonis myth, and is also discussed separately in Chapter 8, ‘Myth and society’. For me, the name of Girard is inseparable from that of Kenneth Burke, who influenced his view of the relationship between myth and violence. But Segal makes only one reference to Burke, and then merely to suggest an affinity with Levi-Strauss. For me, Burke is far more important than Segal allows: I would even go so far as to say that his theory of myth as strategic, symbolic action contains much potential for the future of myth study – perhaps even more than that of Winnicott. All in all, though, this is probably the most comprehensive introduction to myth that there is.

Finally, it is worth emphasising the virtues of Segal’s manner of writing. Having read more or less everything else he has written, I can vouch for the fact that clear, short sentences are typical — which must endear him to many students, who are so often greeted by obfuscation when they seek clarification. At the same time, this book is no ‘bluffer’s guide’: it is a genuine attempt to clarify an area of knowledge that has suffered from vagueness of expression. Non-academic readers will benefit, as will those studying sociology, anthropology, literature, psychology and, of course, religion.

Laurence Coupe

www.laurencecoupe.co.uk

 

Theorizing Myth

Making sense of mythology

Religion 31(2001), pp 164-5

Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology and Scholarship (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1999)

 

Is the word ‘myth’ a synonym for the word ‘ideology’? Lecturers in cultural studies, influenced by Roland Barthes, generally think so. More traditional teachers of literature, influenced by Northrop Frye, wish to honour myth as the sacred paradigm from which all subsequent stories derive; as such, it transcends ideology. Barthes’s interest is in images which endorse the status quo, the most famous being the black soldier saluting the French flag on the cover of Paris Match. Frye’s assumption is that, while there is a body of symbols on which writers draw, the starting point for tracing the influence of myth on literature must be the notion of a certain restricted number of ‘narrative modes’. In this perspective, Barthes is hardly talking about myth at all. Not only does he confine his attention entirely to the modern world, but he has nothing to say about myth as story. In short, he is only talking about ideology, however he tries to complicate his argument.

Though Bruce Lincoln curiously omits Barthes and Frye from this comprehensive study, his position is nicely mediatory. He defines myth as ‘ideology in narrative form’. In the field of the history of religion, this ranks him with the social-scientific approach, since his assumption is that myths have always been instruments of cultural construction. Yet he retains the distinction between myth and ideology by emphasising the crucial differentiating factor, namely narrative. Thus, while he is not inclined to validate myth as a revelation of eternal truth, he goes to considerable pains to avoid appearing to reduce the status of the material he considers. Indeed, when he comes to assess the conventional scholarly account of the ‘Greek miracle’ by which mythos was supposedly superseded by logos, in or around the fifth century BC, he deconstructs the rhetorical manoeuvre that was involved in the discrediting of mere ‘fantasy’ by a supposedly superior ‘reason’. He refers us back to the narratives associated with Hesiod: there mythos was the form of speech appropriate to a noble warrior, while logos was the form of speech associated with those weaklings who wished to undermine the ethics of war and courage. Plato’s victory, in this light, should be seen as a strategic reversal of received values rather than a decisive emancipation of humankind from the naivety of narrative. (Lincoln leaves aside Plato’s own deployment of myth, which might have helped his case by illustrating its indispensability.) This strategy was historically specific, we are told, and must be understood in the context of ‘the consolidation (and contestation) of Athenian democracy, the spread of literacy, and the eclipse of poetry by prose’.

This kind of placing is typical of Lincoln’s strategy in this book. The point is not to establish a case for or against myth, but to demonstrate how and why myth has been understood in particular ways. Thus, as the title suggests, it is about mythography itself as much as it is about mythology. But as the title also indicates, that does not mean that it concerns the nature of theory at the expense of the nature of narrative. Rather, Lincoln is alert to the connection between the two spheres. Thus, he defines myth scholarship itself as ‘myth with footnotes’. By that, he means that, though mythographers can always claim the advantage of hindsight, exemplified in their meticulous research skills, this should be treated with as much caution as they themselves claim to exercise with regard to the primary material. Myth scholarship is ideological; myth scholarship is narrative in form. Therefore we should approach it carefully.

According to Lincoln, there are two main traditions of theorizing myth. The first runs from Plato. As might be expected, this tends to treat myth negatively, regarding it as juvenile and irrational. The legacy of Plato’s condescension is felt in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which proclaims the power of reason and assesses the ignorance of ‘savages’ in the light of that proclamation. The Platonic line is still active in the twentieth century. With Frazer, for example, magic and religion are subsumed and explained by the ideal of scientific rationalism. Lincoln even detects the legacy in Levi-Strauss, given that structuralist anthropology privileges a universal logic or grammar over the peculiarities of narrative. But of course, as he hints, the Platonism gets turned on its head, with the ‘savage mind’ being honoured rather than humbled.

The synchronic model that Levi-Strauss represents has the advantage of proving resistant to the excesses of the second tradition which Lincoln’s book traces. Stemming from Herder, the Romantic line, by contrast with the Platonic, treats myth positively, regarding it as primordial and authentic. But an important lesson which Lincoln wants us to learn is that the friends of myth have all too often proved the enemies of other people. Thus, the cult of the Volk, the endorsement of nationalism in the name of a ‘pure’ Aryan legacy, was the impetus behind the anti-semitism of Wagner. We must not forget what disastrous consequences this ideology had when put to political work in the twentieth century. Plato and his heirs may have denied myth its full narrative power; but Herder and his heirs used narratives for dubious ends.

So who shall escape whipping? Modern mythography seems to have learnt little from the perils which Lincoln documents. For example, Eliade’s claim to study myth in its own right, exempt from any agenda, turns out to be far more ideologically dangerous than most others. It allows him to perpetuate the idea of a sacred, Indo-European, mythic past which is in effect another expression of his extreme right-wing politics. On the other hand, as we have seen, Levi-Strauss, whatever his Platonic tendencies, at least knows how to approach primitive thought with neither condescension nor sentimentality. However, one weakness of this book is that its historical overview has some curious omissions, particularly from the later twentieth century. The presence of Ricoeur, Vernant, Geertz – and, come to think of it, Barthes and Frye – would have allowed Lincoln to test his two traditions, with the possibility of enrichment rather than confusion.

As things stand, we are left with one figure emerging from Lincoln’s book with (shall we say?) the least qualified praise. This is Malinowski. While carefully placing him within the context of Herder’s romanticism, and acknowledging a tendency to glorify tribal integrity in the face of modern atomisation, Lincoln implies that the lesson of ethnography, as evident in Malinowski’s work, was that myth serves present needs even or especially when it narrates a distant past. This kind of functionalist approach would seem to be quite close to Lincoln’s own, unless I am wilfully misreading this book. But then, as he himself proposes, theorizing myth is always partial, interested and ideological. Learning to take that into account is one of the many benefits conferred by reading this complex, provocative work.

Laurence Coupe

Edward Thomas

Dymock Poets and Friends, No. 14 (2015), pp 36-51

 

EDWARD THOMAS AND GREEN STUDIES

Laurence Coupe

Based on a talk given to the Friends of the Dymock Poets on 22 March 2014.

 

I want to assess how far the discipline of green studies has appreciated Edward Thomas, and how it might now proceed to appreciate him, given that he clearly anticipated its concerns.

First, then, we need a definition of ‘green studies’ (a term always used as a singular). Put briefly, it is the UK version of the discipline known in the USA as ‘ecocriticism’, which is an abbreviation of ‘ecological literary criticism’. The idea is to explore the relation between literature and nature: in particular, the literary representation of nature and, just as importantly, the power of literature to inspire its readers to act in defence of nature. Where Marxist criticism focuses on class, feminist criticism on gender, and postcolonial studies on race, green studies is concerned with the theme of the fate of the Earth itself – one which contains, as it were, those other themes.

To appreciate the significance of green studies, we need to be aware that, prior to its emergence in the later twentieth century, a dominant trend in that academic area known as the humanities was simply to privilege culture over nature. One might say that the very word ‘humanities’ indicates the anthropocentric, or human-centred, focus of the enterprise; but it was mainly in the mid-twentieth century that the idea of nature as nothing more than a human construct took hold. Language created reality, culture created nature, words created the world. Though this way of thinking goes back as far as Plato, it was comparatively recently that wholesale ‘cultural constructionism’ took hold in the fields of philosophy, literary studies and (inevitably) cultural studies. Its accompanying refrain, always delivered with an air of self-congratulation, was ‘There is no such thing as nature.’

This phenomenon is something I challenge in my general introduction to The Green Studies Reader, where I refer to ‘the semiotic fallacy’: that is, the privileging of the ‘sign’ (word) over the ‘referent’ (thing), to the extent of denying the independent existence of the latter. In that same introduction, however, I try to point out that exposing the fallacy does not mean we resort to a crude realism: we have to bear in mind how language gives human shape and significance to the natural world which surrounds and contains the human world. What is needed is to see ‘nature’ as a site of struggle: both actual and imaginary, both ecological and ideological. It exists in its own right, over and above what we choose to say about it; but at the same time, it is open to interpretation, and its human meaning emerges in the course of the claims we make about it. ‘Green studies debates “Nature” in order to defend nature.’[1]

To indicate the possibility that Thomas was something of a prophet of green studies, let me begin by quoting his own definition of nature, given in the course of a letter to his friend Walter de la Mare in 1908, shortly after the publication of Thomas’s book Richard Jefferies:

 You ask me to define Nature. I used it [in Richard Jefferies ]vulgarly for all that is not man, perhaps because man contemplates it so, as outside himself, and has a sort of belief that nature is only a house, furniture etc round about him. It is not my belief and I don’t oppose Nature to Man. Quite the contrary. Man seems to me a very little part of Nature and the part I enjoy least. But civilization has estranged us superficially from Nature, and towns make it possible for a man to live as if a millionaire could really provide all the necessities of life, food, drink, clothes, vehicles etc., and then a tombstone.[2]

 Here let me add this remarkable observation, prompted by Thomas’s visit to Salisbury Plain:

 [It] makes us feel the age of the earth, the greatness of Time, Space, and Nature; the littleness of man even in an aeroplane, the fact that the earth does not belong to man, but man to the earth. And this feeling, or some variety of it, for most men is accompanied by melancholy.[3]

 Paraphrasing Thomas, we may say that he puts humanity in its place. To use David Abrams’ terminology, he situates it in the larger context of the ‘more-than-human’ world of nature.[4] In so doing, he challenges the anthropocentric assumptions that came to a head with the cultural constructionism to which I alluded above.

My task here, however, is less to itemise each and every way that Thomas foresaw the agenda of green studies (though we will return to this issue) than to consider how green studies has understood him. In this context, it goes without saying – though let me say it anyway! – that we are all immensely indebted to the scholarly work of Edna Longley, who in the course of collecting and annotating Thomas’s poetry and prose has demonstrated how amenable he is to an ecological reading. Here she reflects on the poetry:

 Few poets can match Thomas’s historical imagination. In fact, his post­-Darwinian approach to ‘the mystery of the past’ is ultimately ‘eco-historical’… Of all the ways in which Thomas’s poetry anticipates ideas that help us to read it, his ecological vision may be the most inclusive. Taken together, his poetry and prose pioneer ‘ecocriticism’.[5]

Elsewhere she reflects: ‘Thomas’s ultimately unifying idea is that of being an “inhabitant” or “citizen of the Earth”.’[6] What I like especially about this latter remark is that Longley actually uses Thomas’s own phrasing. It occurs in his study of George Meredith, an extract of which Longley includes in her selection of Thomas’s prose. She is surely right to draw attention to his wording, which I myself would interpret as Thomas’s way of reminding us that human culture (as suggested by ‘citizen’) can only make sense when seen in the context of more-than-human nature (as suggested by ‘Earth’). Before proceeding, let me provide the context for the phrase, to emphasise how seriously, how reverentially, Thomas spoke of ‘Earth’:

 Nature to him [George Meredith] was not merely a cause of sensuous pleasure, nor, on the other hand, an inhuman enchantress; neither was she both together. When he spoke of Earth, he meant more than most mean who speak of God. He meant that power which in the open air, in poetry, in the company of noble men and women, prompted, strengthened, and could fulfil, the desire of a man to make himself, not a transitory member of parochial species, but a citizen of the Earth …’[7]

 

 It is hard to realise that that way of thinking was expounded a hundred years ago rather than twenty, or even less. It is certainly a point of view that green studies is obliged to take seriously.

***

If green studies had a pioneer, it was undoubtedly Raymond Williams. Though largely associated with a Marxist account of literature and with the rise of cultural studies, he it was who developed in his later years a much greener worldview which became known as ‘socialist ecology’. The key work is The Country and the City. An ambitious survey of poetry and fiction over several centuries, including the twentieth, it charts the problematical relationship between urban and rural experience. Williams regards the genre of ‘pastoral’ as particularly important, because it is there that we witness the idealisation of the countryside, usually undertaken by writers removed from rural reality. As such, it is a falsification, which allows readers to enter into an idyllic world, with complete disregard for the harsh experience of those actually engaged in tilling the soil. Worse still, this pastoral ideal serves to mystify the real foundations of history and class struggle.

It would be gratifying to report that Williams, so important as a founding figure for green studies, recognises Thomas’s importance as an ecological writer in the relevant section of The Country and the City. Unfortunately, he does not. Firstly, he dismisses the Georgian school of poetry: ‘The self-regarding patriotism of the high English imperialist period found this sweetest and most insidious of its forms in a version of the rural past.’ Secondly, he takes Thomas to be simply offering his own version of the Georgian evasion of history and of the reality of the land. Thirdly, he ignores the vast body of Thomas’s writing, and takes that admittedly rather peculiar poem ‘Lob’ as representative. In doing so, he fails to do him justice. Consider this dismissive account:

 … a working man [who has] become ‘my ancient’ and then the casual figure of a dream of England, in which rural labour and rural revolt, foreign wars and internal dynastic wars, history, legend and literature, are indiscriminately enfolded into a single emotional gesture. Lob or Lud, immemorial peasant or yeoman or labourer: the figure was now fixed and its name was Old England …[8]

 I would not want to claim ‘Lob’ to be one of Thomas’s best works, but the point is that Williams is taking full advantage of its ambiguity in order to dismiss a body of work that, as a whole, mystifies neither England nor the history of its people, but rather encourages the reader to consider both in a larger perspective – such as was indicated above by Edna Longley.

Williams goes on to quote the second verse of another poem by another poet, namely Thomas Hardy’s famous lyric, ‘In Time of “The Breaking of Nations”, in order to demonstrate its superiority to anything his successor and admirer Edward Thomas ever wrote. We will recall the opening, with its ‘man harrowing clods’ and its ‘old horse that stumbles and nods’. Then comes the verse which Williams quotes:

 Only thin smoke without flame
From the heaps of couch-grass;
Yet this will go onward the same
Though Dynasties pass.

 His point in praising Hardy here is to dismiss Thomas and his peers: ‘That is the feeling of the persistence of land work through what seem the distant accidents of political history. But the Georgian version used rural England as an image for its own internal feelings and ideas.’[9] (258) Williams overlooks the fact that it was Thomas more than any of his contemporaries who admired Hardy’s poetry and who learnt how one might incorporate the stuff of rural life in seemingly slight lyrics.

We should also note that, in invoking Hardy, Williams fails even to refer to a poem of Thomas’s that really does seek to incorporate the harsh realities of the day. I mean ‘As the team’s head-brass’, of course. We recall how the poet first sets the scene:

 As the team’s head-brass flashed out on the turn
The lovers disappeared into the wood.
I sat among the boughs of the fallen elm
That strewed the angle of the fallow, and
Watched the plough narrowing a yellow square
Of charlock. …

 That plough is not merely a feature in the scene, however. In time, we hear the ploughman speak, as he enters into conversation with the poet:

 ‘… Only two teams work on the farm this year.
One of my mates is dead. The second day
In France they killed him. It was back in March,
The very night of the blizzard, too. Now if
He had stayed here we should have moved the tree.’

 Finally, the poet stands back again to survey the scene:

 … Then
The lovers came out of the wood again:
The horses started and for the last time
I watched the clods crumble and topple over
After the ploughshare and the stumbling team.                      (123-4)

The idea that Thomas ignores actuality and opts for archetypal meaning, divorced from history, cannot withstand even a cursory reading of the poem. Here we are put in touch with the world of human labour; here we have not a solipsistic meditation, but the presentation of a genuine dialogue between poet and agricultural labourer; here we register the impact of history – not only the effects of the decline of agriculture in the England of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the consequences for those remaining to work the land, but also the trauma of the Great War. Nor should we forget the reminder of how different lives run concurrently, the lovers pursuing their love in parallel with the poet and ploughman ,each seeking to make sense of the land and its history. No wonder Hardy admired Thomas so much, and no wonder Thomas saw himself as working in continuity with the great master. How Williams could overlook such continuity remains a mystery.

***

If Williams represented the central assessment of Thomas’s work within green studies, mine would be a disappointing venture. Fortunately, we find a rather more positive account when we turn to the work of Jonathan Bate – even though it may not be one with which we want wholly to concur. In his Romantic Ecology (1991), he puts forward the idea of a Romantic environmental tradition, originating with Wordsworth and eventually including Edward Thomas. By way of a rejoinder to Raymond Williams, Bate defends pastoral as a potentially radical force, given that it rests on a positive view of the countryside and involves a critique of the given urban hierarchy. In Wordsworth’s hands, muses Bate, it involves advocacy of rural community and democracy as well as sympathy with the surrounding world of nature. Thomas he sees as taking up the Wordsworthian baton:

For Thomas, as for Wordsworth, pastoral was not a myth but a psychological necessity, an underpinning of the self, a way of connecting the self to the environment. . In literature as in life, connection with the external world is dependent on what [John] Clare called ‘The Eternity of Nature’, dependent on the survival of the daisy and the return of the swallow.’[10]

 But the connection which Bate is most keen to trace is that between Wordsworth’s ‘Poems on the Naming of Places’ and Thomas’s ‘Household Poems’, written for his wife and children – the latter being directly inspired by the earlier sequence. It is the sense of locality and the need to name, know and revere particular places that unites Wordsworth and Thomas most particularly.

Now, while fully acknowledging Bate’s contribution to our understanding of Thomas in relation to the poetic canon, I would demur as to the choice of predecessor. To my mind, Thomas’s vision has far more in common with another Romantic poet, namely John Keats. For one thing, Thomas wrote his own short study of Keats; for another, several of his own poems seem to have been inspired by Keats – ‘Melancholy’, for instance, clearly deriving from the famous ‘Ode on Melancholy’. But let me make my case briefly by first quoting from one of Keats’s letters:

 I lay awake last night — listening to the Rain with a sense of being drown’d and rotted like a grain of wheat — There is a continual courtesy between the Heavens and the Earth. — the heavens rain down their unwelcomeness, and the Earth sends it up again to be returned to morrow.[11]

 Now compare this with Thomas’s reflections from his prose work The Icknield Way (1913):

 I am alone in the dark still night, and my ear listens to the rain piping in the gutters and roaring softly in the trees of the world. Even so will the rain fall darkly upon the grass over the grave when my ears can hear it no more… Now there is neither life nor death, but only the rain… the rain falls for ever and I am melting into it. Black and monotonously sounding is the midnight and solitude of the rain. In a little while or in an age — for it is all one — I shall know the full truth of the words I used to love, I knew not why, in my days of nature, in the days before the rain: ‘Blessed are the dead that the rain rains on.’[12]

 Though at one point in this passage Thomas complains that he does not feel himself to be ‘a part of nature’, that wording is surely meant to indicate his sense of isolation. Otherwise, his reflections echo those of Keats. Indeed, I would say that despite his complaint, the mood that both writers share is that of desiring to merge with the more-than-human world and to have done with the burden of individual identity. In other words, the desire for union with nature and the desire for death are entertained concurrently. What both involve is a process of what we might call un-selfing.

Here are three further statements from Keats’s letters, in which we see that the readiness to merge with nature is part and parcel of his thinking about what constitutes great literature:

 I scarcely remember counting upon any happiness – I look not for it if it be not in the present hour — nothing startles me beyond the moment. The setting sun will always set me to rights — or if a sparrow come before my window I take part in its existence and pick about the gravel.

 … it struck me what quality went to form a man of achievement, especially in literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously. I mean negative capability: that is, when man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.

 … as to the poetical character itself (I mean that sort of which, if I am anything, I am a member — that sort distinguished from the Wordsworthian or egotistical sublime, which is a thing per se and stands alone), it is not itself — it has no self — it is everything and nothing — it has no character — it enjoys light and shade — it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated.[13]

We note, pace Bate, the repudiation of the Wordsworthian aesthetic in that last quotation: unfair as the judgement no doubt is, Keats rejects his predecessor’s way of depicting nature because, instead of celebrating nature in all its variety and wonder, it always seems to return to a celebration of his own magisterial soul. As to the second quotation, it would be tempting here to expound upon that profound and endlessly fruitful phrase, ‘negative capability’, but suffice it to say that the impulse behind it – to cease to exist as an individual and to be at one with that which lies beyond the ego – is clearly bound up with that readiness to identify with the sparrow in the first quotation. As to its literary manifestation, we might refer to this, probably the most famous stanza of one of his most famous poems, ‘Ode to a Nightingale’:

Darkling I listen; and, for many a time
I have been half in love with easeful Death,
Call’d him soft names in many a mused rhyme,
To take into the air my quiet breath;
Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
To cease upon the midnight with no pain,
While thou art pouring forth thy soul abroad
In such an ecstasy!
Still wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in vain—
To thy high requiem become a sod.[14]

 Now let us turn back to Thomas. We quoted him above, pondering the wet weather in the course of one of his prose works. Here is the complementary poem, ‘Rain’:

 Rain, midnight rain, nothing but the wild rain
On this bleak hut, and solitude, and me
Remembering again that I shall die
And neither hear the rain nor give it thanks
For washing me cleaner than I have been
Since I was born into this solitude.
Blessed are the dead that the rain rains upon:
But here I pray that none whom once I loved
Is dying to-night or lying still awake
Solitary, listening to the rain,
Either in pain or thus in sympathy
Helpless among the living and the dead,
Like a cold water among broken reeds,
Myriads of broken reeds all still and stiff,
Like me who have no love which this wild rain
Has not dissolved except the love of death,
If love it be towards what is perfect and
Cannot, the tempest tells me, disappoint.        (105)

 Specifically, the phrase ‘love of death’ comes directly from Keats; in general, the mood of the poem and the disposition of the poet are so thoroughly Keatsian that it is hard to see how any green-minded critic could think that Wordsworth was Thomas’s mentor.

Aware that we have traced this connection at some length, let me draw this phase of our discussion to a close by quoting from Thomas’s short but inspiring study, Keats (written late 1913; published 1916). Here he defends his poetic hero from the charge of weakness and self-indulgence. With Lord Byron’s dismissive comments in mind, Thomas is emphatic in his riposte to such hostile misunderstandings of the kind of genius that he himself admired so much, and to which (I would suggest) he was himself so close in spirit:

 These last months of dissolution coupled with the most obvious qualities of his earlier poems have given colour to the belief that Keats was an invertebrate, one to be ‘snuffed out by an article’. He was himself the first discoverer of that ‘morbidity of temperament’. That he did discover it, that he had a wonderful self-knowledge — not mere self-analysis — calm and penetrating, never coldly submissive, is a proof that it was not the whole truth. The morbidity was the occasional overbalancing of his intense sympathy, his greatest passive power.[15]

Here it seems appropriate to quote from a poem of Thomas which might itself be misconstrued as an expression of morbidity, when it is in fact an affirmation of a willingness to accept one’s own contingency and to acknowledge the absolute emptiness that contains the apparent fullness of all our lives. In ‘Old Man’ the poet ponders the plant, then the name of the plant, the relation between word and thing which thinking about the plant prompts, then the personal memories associated with the plant … and then makes a final leap of consciousness:

Where first I met the bitter scent is lost.
I, too, often shrivel the grey shreds,
Sniff them and think and sniff again and try
Once more to think what it is I am remembering,
Always in vain. I cannot like the scent,
Yet I would rather give up others more sweet,
With no meaning, than this bitter one.
I have mislaid the key. I sniff the spray
And think of nothing; I see and I hear nothing;
Yet seem, too, to be listening, lying in wait
For what I should, yet never can, remember;
No garden appears, no path, no hoar-green bush
Of Lad’s-love, or Old Man, no child beside,
Neither father nor mother, nor any playmate;
Only an avenue, dark, nameless, without end.             (36-7)

 ***

 If Bate’s choice of precursor for Thomas in Romantic Ecology is open to question, a more promising perspective might seem to be provided in his later study in ‘ecopoetics’, The Song of the Earth (2000). Here the dominant figure is not the English Romantic poet Wordsworth but the twentieth-century German thinker Martin Heidegger. Let us consider briefly how Bate’s attempt to trace an affinity between philosopher and poet works out. I will necessarily have to simplify matters. Heidegger was a notoriously obscure thinker, who coined an esoteric vocabulary, the meaning of which is still contentious today. Here I offer my own summation rather than convey the full extent of Bate’s exploration of Heideggerian thought.

It is the later Heidegger who matters most to those engaged in green studies. His preoccupation is with the nature of poetic ‘dwelling’. It is through language, and above all through the intense language of lyric poetry, that humanity learns reverence for earthly things, for it is in so doing that it achieves a revelation of earthly things. These ‘things’ include ‘rocks and stones and trees’ (here I invoke Wordsworth); but they also include those artefacts and tools which are created by traditional craft, which in turn expresses ‘care’ for the Earth. Heidegger is anxious to distinguish these artefacts and tools from the objects churned out in processes of mass production. To appreciate a tree, to appreciate a tool: this is to effect an ‘unconcealing’ of the ‘Being’ of things. ‘Being’ for Heidegger is rather like ‘Brahman’ in Hinduism, the ‘Tao’ in Taoism, and the ‘Buddha-mind’ in Buddhism: that is, it is the divine source underlying the natural world which we see all around us. Poetry matters, because the poet is the ‘guardian of Being’, the ‘shepherd of Being’: it is through poetry that we align ourselves with nature, and with the spirit that sustains it.

So, then, we have complementary forces in Heidegger’s thought: language and ‘Being’, poetry and nature, logos (word) and oikos (Earth, understood as our true home). The question arises for Bate that, if it is through the former that humanity apprehends the latter, does that mean that humanity is always separated from the source it seeks? Are we condemned only to know oikos in terms of logos, rather than to find final reconciliation with it? His answer, on behalf of Heidegger, is as follows: ‘If mortals dwell in that they save the earth and if poetry is the original admission of dwelling, then poetry is the place where we save the earth.’[16]

It is in the final pages of his book that Bate attempts a Heidegerrian reading of Thomas. Given that the philosopher speaks so much of ‘dwelling’, he chooses one of the poems which Thomas entitled ‘Home’: in this case, the second one (‘Often I had gone…’).The first one is about difficulty of finding home; this one is about arriving there. ‘Home’ 1 is a poem of restlessness; ‘Home’ 2 is a poem of dwelling.

Here are two key passages from Thomas’s poem. First, the setting of the scene in the opening lines:

 Often I had gone this way before
But now it seemed I never could be
And never had been anywhere else;
‘Twas home; one nationality
We had, I and the birds that sang,
One memory. …

 Thomas imagines – or rather, is convinced – that the birds are welcoming him back. Their insouciant song tells him that they are no more heedful of the fact that the day is closing than is he. Thus Thomas proceeds to his final reflection: this time, not on the countryside itself nor on the birds, but on the work being carried out by a rural workman who lives close by:

 … Then past his dark white cottage front
A labourer went along, his tread
Slow, half with weariness, half with ease;
And, through the silence, from his shed
The sound of sawing rounded all
That silence said.                                              (81-2)

If I may summarise Bate’s reading, he notes in particular that the poet, the birds and the natural environment all speak the same language: all is one. Into this idyllic setting is introduced the sound of the labourer’s sawing, but this is not an intrusion: his work does not represent mindless technology, but rather a necessary craft, since humans must dwell locally and plant, then fell, trees to survive. The silence of nature is ‘rounded off’ by the human act. Bate sees the poem as enacting exactly what Heidegger means by ‘dwelling’. Though the words of the text are haunted by the split between subject and object, as asserted by the early-modern philosopher Descartes, the poem allows us to experience, if only momentarily, what it might be like to dwell poetically upon the Earth.

There are, however, some problems in invoking Heidegger in order to celebrate a poem by Thomas. Most obviously, but still debatably, there is the undeniably fascist element in his thinking. As a member of the Nazi party in the 1930s, Heidegger was subscribing to the same cult of the Aryan peasant and rural craft as was officially sanctioned by Hitler and Goebbels in their pursuit of German nationalism. Here is not the place to enter into the ongoing debate about Heidegger’s politics, but my instinct is that Edward Thomas would have found them uncongenial and, had he lived, would have repudiated them. Even though he loved the English countryside, and though he fought for England in the Great War, his own aim was to be ‘a citizen of the Earth’, not a narrow nationalist (no matter how sophisticated).

Again, we have to recognise that, for all Heidegger’s talk of the need to serve and guard ‘Being’, there is a strongly anthropocentric quality to his thinking. After all, in emphasising the primacy of poetic dwelling he is implicitly privileging the human world as offering special access to the truth of the Earth. Human beings are unique, and uniquely gifted, in this respect: it is not a capacity granted to birds and other beings. Lastly, it is ironic that Thomas the impoverished, practising poet would most likely disagreed with Heidegger the privileged professor about the status of poetry: for Heidegger, it was the answer to everything; for Thomas, who did not build up the confidence to start writing verse until he was 36, it was just one discipline that might help us appreciate the natural order.

To elaborate briefly on just one of those points: as far as nationalism is concerned, Thomas’s understanding, as indicated by the fourth line of ‘Home’, is that an England that does not include the birds is not a proper nation. Nor should we overlook the subtle way that, in his prose, he ponders the interplay of locality and the land as a whole:

[A]ll ideas of England are developed, spun out, from such a centre [ie, a specific place] into something large or infinite, solid or airy, according to each man’s nature and capacity; that England is a system of vast circumferences circling round the minute neighbouring points of home.[17]

Here I might mention a work that, though not strictly a contribution to green studies, is an excellent guide to the whole question of nation, landscape and ideology: Roger Ebbatson’s An Imaginary England (2005). Ebbatson manages to demonstrate that the natural world is always open to conflicting interpretations, without subscribing to a reductive ‘cultural constructionism’. In his discussion of Thomas, he addresses the way that he persistently repudiates the ‘official’ idea of England and sets out the grounds for an alternative idea of England. A stimulus to this discussion is this, Thomas’s remarkable statement about the need to view a place as an imaginative challenge not a definable location:

 This is not the South Country which measures about two hundred miles from the east to the west and fifty from north to south. In some ways, it is incomparably larger than any country that has ever mapped, since upon nothing less than the infinite can the spirit disport itself.[18]

Ebbatson is interested in the way Thomas defamiliarises cultural stereotypes of rural nostalgia, suggesting a much more unsettled land: ‘Indeed a national sense of identity or a settled Englishness is radically undermined by the darkness Thomas detected within himself in his almost hallucinatory degree of self-consciousness and division …’ Hence his fascination with outsiders and the dispossessed: ‘The nomadic wanderers who haunt Thomas’s texts, as figures for the poet, represent an otherness antithetical to settlement and modernity through their investment in libertarian displacement and cultural authenticity.’ (Ebbotson p 171) Hence too his sense of his own contingency, reflected in the restless, unfinished quality of his art: ‘Edward Thomas’s poems are clearly characterised … by a sense of incompletion, unsettlement and resistance to the centralising forces of an increasingly administered culture.’[19] (p 173) None of this, we might add, marks him down as the spiritual companion of one Martin Heidegger.

***

Where, then, does Thomas stand vis-à-vis green studies? My own instinct is that to appreciate fully his significance as an ecologically-oriented writer, we need to invoke a green theorist who – paradoxically – never actually wrote about him. I refer to the late American thinker, Theodore Roszak.

Before explaining Roszak’s position, let me provide another quotation from a prose work of Thomas’s which we have already cited, The South Country (1909). In a chapter on ‘History and the Parish’, he reflects:

The eye that sees the things of today, and the ear that hears, the mind that contemplates or dreams, is itself an instrument of an antiquity equal to whatever it is called upon to apprehend. We are not merely twentieth-century Londoners or Kentish men or Welshmen… And of these many folds in our nature the face of the earth reminds us, and perhaps, even where there are no more marks visible upon the land than there were in Eden, we are aware of the passing of time in ways too difficult and strange for the explanation of historian and zoologist and philosopher.[20]          

We sense here that long perspective which preoccupied Thomas throughout his adult life, both as poet and prose writer: he always insists on putting humanity in its place, within a larger context, both spatially and temporally. Here it is time, and specifically the time of evolution, which concerns him. Elsewhere, he frequently reflects on how humanity must find accommodation with the larger space of nature – as in the letter to De La Mare with which we began.

Here we might remind ourselves of the closing two verses of one of his most strikingly stark poems about the insufficiency of humanity and the necessity for it to learn how to follow the rhythm of the Earth upon which it depends. ‘I never saw that land before’ ends as follows:

 I neither expected anything
Nor yet remembered: but some goal
I touched then; and if I could sing
What would not even whisper my soul
As I went on my journeying,

I should use, as the trees and birds did,
A language not to be betrayed;
And what was hid should still be hid
Excepting from those like me made
Who answer when such whispers bid.              (120)

 Such privilege as Thomas here claims for the poet is that of understanding the need for service, not the advantage of mastery or of superior knowledge. In learning how to use ‘A language not to be betrayed’ he is simply familiarising himself with the wisdom of the more-than-human world. If asked to sum up Thomas’s position, I would do so as follows. Nature is that larger culture which contains the narrow sphere of human culture, and into which human beings may have occasional insights if they purge themselves of their arrogant anthropocentrism.

Roszak’s work is also about the wisdom of humility. Here let me summarise the principles of the discipline which he founded, and which he called ‘ecopsychology’. In essence, he is saying that humanity has become increasingly divorced from nature, that ‘person’ has been detached from ‘planet’. Our conscious human actions are destroying the Earth, but most of the time we ignore the fact, so it is left to the ‘ecological unconscious’ to register the catastrophe. Manifestations include illness, anxiety, mental disturbance. In short, ecospychology is the study of our ability to register pain at what we are doing to the Earth. It aims to bridge the longstanding gulf between person and planet, mind and nature. The title of Roszak’s key work on this subject, The Voice of the Earth (1992) speaks of the need to regain a ‘transactional bond’ with nature: a bond which was severed with modernity and the myth of progress.[21]

In light of Roszak’s work, we might see Thomas as environmental prophet. Firstly, he laments the decline of rural life, and in particular the collapse of English agriculture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Secondly, he laments the urbanisation and homogenisation of civilisation: he looks to marginal groups for his vision of ‘England’. Thirdly, he sees the war as a representative act of collective violence – against nature as well as humanity itself. Fourthly, and most importantly, he registers the pain of modernity in his own mental anguish, which he manages to depersonalise in the act of writing.

I would like to stress that last point. With Thomas, we are concerned with more than individual pathology. The mental anguish which he endured – often finding expression in attempted suicide, as we know from the diaries – is the result of his extreme sensitivity to the damage done by humanity in the name of technological advancement.

Here let me quote some lines from some poems to which we have not yet referred, by way of bringing our survey to an end. Please think of what I said above about Roszak and Thomas when reading them. For instance, in ‘The Mill Water’, human labour is seen as one small part of the workings of the Earth:

 All thoughts begin or end upon this sound,
Only the idle foam
Of water falling
Changelessly calling,
Where once men had a work-place and a home.          (98)

Again, in ‘The Mountain Chapel’, the wind’s voice which is heard across the graveyard adjacent to the sacred building speaks with an authority to which we know we must submit:  ”Tis but a moment since man’s birth  / And in another moment more /
Man lies in earth / For ever; but I am the same / Now, and shall be, even as I was
Before he came; / Till there is nothing I shall be.’  As the poet concludes: ‘When Gods were young / This wind was old.’    (43)

Even in that most familiar of his poems, ‘Adlestrop’, the comings and goings of humanity, the power of the train engine — these are put in place by the larger context of nature:

And for that minute a blackbird sang
Close by, and round him, mistier,
Farther and farther, all the birds
Of Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire.                           (51)

Though the counties are precisely named, and to that extent humanised, the effect is of an endless movement outwards into a more comprehensive sphere of existence. It is this sphere which provides solace for the tormented soul, all too aware of the breaking of the bond with nature, in ‘Beauty’:

This heart, some fraction of me, happily
Floats through a window even now to a tree
Down in the misting, dim-lit, quiet vale;
Not like a pewit that returns to wail
For something it has lost, but like a dove
That slants unswerving to its home and love.
There I find my rest, and through the dusk air
Flies what yet lives in me. Beauty is there.                 (58)

 Finally, we might read the full text of ‘The Word’, a meditation on how human endeavours relate to the processes of the Earth, how human culture relates to the larger culture of Earth, and how human language relates to the voice of the Earth. It is a poem about how to learn to be ‘a citizen of the Earth’, how to find peace by acknowledging the green world that surrounds us as our only true home, and which speaks a language beyond our own limited vocabulary:

 There are so many things I have forgot,
That once were much to me, or that were not,
All lost, as is a childless woman’s child
And its child’s children, in the undefiled
Abyss of what can never be again.
I have forgot, too, names of the mighty men
That fought and lost or won in the old wars,
Of kings and fiends and gods, and most of the stars.
Some things I have forgot that I forget.
But lesser things there are, remembered yet,
Than all the others. One name that I have not —
Though ’tis an empty thingless name — forgot
Never can die because Spring after Spring
Some thrushes learn to say it as they sing.
There is always one at midday saying it clear
And tart — the name, only the name I hear.
While perhaps I am thinking of the elder scent
That is like food, or while I am content
With the wild rose scent that is like memory,
This name suddenly is cried out to me
From somewhere in the bushes by a bird
Over and over again, a pure thrush word.                  (93)

 

Note on contributor:

Laurence Coupe is visiting professor at Manchester Metropolitan University, where he previously worked as a senior lecturer and where he pioneered ‘green studies’. Besides being the founding editor of the journal Green Letters, he is the editor of The Green Studies Reader: From Romanticism to Ecocriticism (Routledge, 2000). Other books include Myth (Routledge, 1997; 2nd ed. 2009), Marina Warner (Northcote House, 2006), Beat Sound, Beat Vision: The Beat Spirit and Popular Song (MUP, 2007), and Kenneth Burke: From Myth to Ecology: (Parlor Press, 2013).

References

[1] Laurence Coupe, ‘Introduction’, The Green Studies Reader: From Romanticism to Ecocriticism (London: Routledge, 2000), p 5.

[2] Edward Thomas: Selected Letters, ed. R. George Thomas (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p 51

[3] Edward Thomas, In Pursuit of Spring (London: Thomas Nelson & Son, 1914), p 12.

[4] See David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World (New York: Random House, 1966).

[5] Edna Longley, ‘Introduction’, Edward Thomas: The Annotated Collected Poems (Tarset, Northumberland: Bloodaxe Books, 2008) p 22. All poems of Thomas quoted here will be taken from this volume.

[6] Edna Longley, ‘Introduction’, A Language not to be Betrayed: Selected Prose of Edward Thomas (Manchester: Carcanet, 1981), p xix.

[7] Edward Thomas, A Literary Pilgrim in England (London: Methuen, 1917), p 52.

[8] Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (London: Hogarth Press, 1973), p 258.

[9] Ibid., p. 258.

[10] Jonathan Bate, Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the Environmental Tradition (London: Routledge,1991), p 115.

[11] To save space I am not including dates or names of recipients. In this particular case I use an online version: http://users.dickinson.edu/~nicholsa/Romnat/keatslet.htm [accessed 15 March 2014]

[12] Edward Thomas, The Icknield Way (London: Constable, 1913), pp 280, 283.

[13] Keats’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Jeffrey N. Cox (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2009), pp 103, 109, 294-5.

[14] Keats’s Poetry and Prose, p 459.

[15] Edward Thomas, Keats: His Work and His Character (London T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1916; repr. Cheltenham: Cider Press, 1999 ), p 52.

[16] Jonathan Bate, The Song of the Earth (London: Picador, 2000), p 283.

[17] Edward Thomas, The Last Sheaf, published 1928; included in A Language Not To Be Betrayed, p 231.

[18] Thomas, The South Country, p 8.

[19] Roger Ebbatson, An Imaginary England: Literature and Landscape 1840-1920 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp 170, 171, 173.

[20] Thomas, The South Country, pp 151-2.

[21] Theodore Roszak, The Voice Of The Earth: An Exploration of Ecopsychology (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1992; 2nd ed 2001), p 81.